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Comment 
Reviewing the Impact of the Supreme Court’s 
Interpretation of “Social Media” as Applied to Off-
Campus Student Speech 
Katherine A. Ferry* 
The Internet and social media have a profound impact on society as a 
whole, but especially on teenagers. As technology continues to evolve, 
and more people gain access to social media, online speech will only 
serve to enhance the ways in which students engage and communicate. 
Inevitably, problems continue to arise; specifically, how much schools 
curtail students’ First Amendment rights to maintain a productive 
educational environment. The Supreme Court articulated that students 
have First Amendment rights in the schoolhouse in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, but the Court has not faced the 
issue of whether speech occurring off-campus is afforded the same 
protection. The federal appellate courts have applied Tinker and its 
progeny to off-campus speech, but distorted the framework, leading to 
inconsistent First Amendment protection. However, the Supreme Court 
recently held social media garners First Amendment protection in 
Packingham v. North Carolina. 
This Comment explores the Supreme Court’s holdings on student 
speech and social media, and ultimately argues for school districts to 
implement their own policies regarding off-campus speech until the 
Supreme Court provides guidance. It will first explore the seminal 
Supreme Court cases on school speech and the federal appellate courts’ 
split. Then, it examines the Supreme Court’s holdings regarding the 
Internet and social media. Next, it will analyze the multiple tests applied 
by the federal appellate courts and critique individual school social 
media policies. It concludes by recommending a model framework for 
schools to use while drafting individual social media policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is one of the most important channels for the exchange of 
views, revolutionizing the means for citizens to communicate, debate, 
and engage with one another.1 The Internet drives the stock market, 
shapes elections, and enhances education in the United States.2 While the 
Internet is widely used and available to all age groups, teenagers report 
using the Internet the most, facilitated by the convenience and efficiency 
of smartphones.3 The majority of the time teenagers spend on the Internet 
is on social networking websites; Facebook in particular, but 71 percent 
of teenagers use more than one social networking site.4 As such, social 
media has a profound impact on the secondary school setting.5 
 
1. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (describing the Internet as the 
most important place for the exercise of speech); Julie Seaman & David Sloan Wilson, 
#FREESPEECH, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1013, 1014 (2016) (stating “[t]he magnitude of this recent 
change in the pace, content, culture . . . of communication [on the Internet] is unprecedented in 
human history”). 
2. DARREN LILLEKER & NIGEL JACKSON, POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING, ELECTIONS AND THE 
INTERNET: COMPARING THE US, UK, FRANCE, AND GERMANY 14–18 (Routledge 2011) 
(highlighting the role the Internet plays in elections). See also Robert J. Shiller, How Stories Drive 
the Stock Market, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/upshot/how-
stories-drive-the-stock-market.html (discussing the stock market fluctuations due to breaking 
news). 
3. Amanda Lehnhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technology-
2015/; Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 12, 2017), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ (comparing social media use by age group 
and providing statistics on teenagers’ social media use that indicate 92 percent of teens report going 
online daily compared with only 73 percent of adults). See also Christina Nguyen, Monitoring Your 
Teenagers’ Online Activity: Why Consent or Disclosure Should Be Required, 15 SEATTLE J. SOC. 
JUST. 261, 267–70 (2016) (discussing how access to the Internet has increased among teenagers in 
recent years). 
4. Lehnhart, supra note 3; Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 3. 
5. See Alana Nunez-Garcia, How Much Does Social Media Affect High School Students?, L.A. 
TIMES HIGH SCHOOL INSIDER (June 17, 2016), http://highschool.latimes.com/saint-joseph-high-
school/how-much-does-social-media-affect-high-school-students/ (explaining research conducted 
on high school students’ opinions of the interplay between social media and education). See PBS 
NewsHour: Schools are Watching Students’ Social Media, Raising Questions About Free Speech, 
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The First Amendment provides a constitutional protection for speech, 
but its interplay with social media remains undefined. This is especially 
problematic considering the impact of social media on society.6 However, 
the Supreme Court recently provided clarity in Packingham v. North 
Carolina, in which it extended First Amendment protection to social 
media.7 Packingham presented the question of when social media use can 
be restricted, striking down a North Carolina statute that prohibited sex 
offenders from accessing social networking sites.8 Most importantly, 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, equated the Internet to a public 
park, and reasoned that because cyberspace is the most important place 
for the exchange of views, blanket restrictions on social media cannot 
stand.9 Certainly this protection extends to adults, but how does the 
holding in Packingham extend to students in the school setting?10 
Legal issues concerning students’ free speech rights have been around 
for decades.11 The Supreme Court’s pronouncement of a student’s right 
to speak freely in school dates back to 1969 when, in Tinker v. Des 
Moines, the Court affirmed students’ constitutional right to free speech 
while on school grounds.12 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have 
 
PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE (June 20, 2017) (interviewing high school students about their 
relationship with social media). 
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Geoffrey R. Stone, Privacy, the First Amendment, and the Internet, 
in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION (Saul Levmore & Martha C. 
Nussbaum eds., Harvard Univ. Press 2010) (discussing First Amendment questions stemming from 
Internet usage). 
7. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
8. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a) (West 2017) (stating “it is unlawful for a sex 
offender who is registered . . . to access a commercial social networking Web site”). 
9. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (describing the Internet as “the modern public square”). For 
more information on the impermissible blanket restriction on speech in Packingham, see infra Part 
II.B. 
10. See infra Part III.B (comparing school social media policies to the reasoning in Packingham 
and concluding that the holding in Packingham should extend to students). 
11. Stephanie Klupinski, Getting Past the Schoolhouse Gate: Rethinking Student Speech in the 
Digital Age, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 617–26 (2010) (analyzing the history of student speech rights, 
beginning with Tinker and ending with district court cases in 2010). See generally Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate: What’s 
Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 529–34 (2000) (discussing the history of Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District and subsequent Supreme Court cases relating to 
student speech). 
12. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). In Tinker, the 
Court fashioned the “substantial and material disruption” test to analyze school speech. See infra 
Part I.A (discussing the substantial and material disruption standard). For one perspective on what 
constitutes a substantial and material disruption, see Mitchell J. Waldman, What oral statement of 
student is sufficiently disruptive so as to fall beyond protection of first amendment, 76 A.L.R. FED. 
599 § 1 (1986) (discussing cases in which courts found a substantial and material disruption 
present); see also Nancy Willard, Student Online Off-Campus Speech: Assessing “Substantial 
Disruption”, 22 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 611, 620 (2012) (analyzing what constitutes a “substantial 
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further clarified the restrictions and protections on student speech, but the 
matter has not been before the high court since 2007.13 However, all of 
these issues and subsequent restrictions on speech were enacted to 
regulate speech occurring inside the schoolhouse, leaving the protection 
of speech made outside school grounds open to debate.14 Additionally 
complicating the matter, the Supreme Court has been silent on the issue.15 
While most juveniles’ Internet and social media usage occurs outside 
of school, it can and often does ends up impacting the school 
community.16 As such, there has recently been a trend of school 
discipline stemming from student conduct on social media.17 For 
example, the senior class president at Heights High School, Wesley 
Teague, was suspended for the remainder of the school year after 
comparing the school’s football team to a notoriously bad college football 
team on Twitter.18 School officials claimed Teague intended to cause a 
 
disruption”). 
13. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (barring student speech that 
advocates illegal activity). See also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) 
(allowing schools to discipline school-sponsored speech); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (allowing school administrators authority to discipline lewd speech). 
14. See Alison Hofheimer, Saved by the Bell? Is Online, Off-Campus Student Speech Protected 
by the First Amendment?, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 971, 984 (2013) (discussing whether schools can 
punish off-campus speech and to what end). See generally Caitlin May, “Internet-Savvy Students” 
and Bewildered Educators: Student Internet Speech is Creating New Legal Issues for the 
Educational Community, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 1105 (2009) (discussing the implications of reaching 
into students’ homes to punish off-campus speech). 
15. Carolyn Schurr Levin, Legal Analysis: How far can schools go in limiting student speech 
online?, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER (June 6, 2016, 10:49 AM), 
http://www.splc.org/article/2016/06/legal-analysis-student-speech (stating that “[b]ecause the 
United States Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the First Amendment implications of off 
campus student speech on social media and elsewhere on the internet, a definitive rule is hard, if 
not impossible, to enunciate”). See Elizabeth A. Shaver, Denying Certiorari in Bell v. Itawamba 
County School Board: A Missed Opportunity to Clarify Students’ First Amendment Rights in the 
Digital Age, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1539, 1573 (2016) (discussing the problem posed by the Court of 
not addressing off-campus speech). 
16. Abhishek Karadkar, The Impact of Social Media on Student Life, TECHNICIAN (Sept. 13, 
2015), http://www.technicianonline.com/opinion/article_d1142b70-5a92-11e5-86b4-
cb7c98a6e45f.html. See The Internet, Free Speech, and Schools, NATIONAL ASS’N OF INDEP. 
SCHS. (2013), https://www.nais.org/magazine/independent-school/winter-2013/the-internet,-free-
speech,-and-schools/ (providing background on the effects of social media on students and 
schools). 
17. For a synopsis of examples of student suspensions relating to conduct on social media, see 
Benjamin Herold, 10 Social Media Controversies That Landed Students in Trouble This School 
Year, EDUCATION WEEK (July 6, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/06/29/10-
social-media-controversies-that-landed-students-in-trouble.html. 
18. Watch What You Tweet: Schools, Censorship, and Social Media, NATIONAL COALITION 
AGAINST CENSORSHIP, http://ncac.org/watch-what-you-tweet-schools-censorship-and-social-
media [hereinafter Watch What You Tweet]; Rebecca Klein, Wesley Teague, Kansas Student, 
Suspended After Tweeting About His High School Sports Program, HUFFINGTON POST (May 9, 
2013, 8:27 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/09/wesley-teague-suspended-twitter-
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disturbance and forbid him from giving the commencement speech at 
graduation.19 In 2012, a high school student created an anti-bullying 
video to raise awareness of the harmful effects of bullying.20 Once school 
officials caught wind, she was subsequently suspended because her 
speech posed a disruption in school.21 Moreover, students can be 
suspended for simply ‘liking’ or ‘retweeting’ another person’s content.22 
When these cases make it to court, there is little guidance as to how 
they should be interpreted and what precedent, if any, should apply to the 
off-campus speech.23 In the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme 
Court, the federal appellate courts have developed several of their own 
tests to determine if a school has the authority to regulate off-campus 
speech.24 Because of this inconsistency, there is currently an unequal 
application of the First Amendment to students’ rights, which results in 
students’ geographical location having a large impact on whether their 
speech will be protected.25 To avoid this, school districts should fashion 
policies that promote safety while still protecting the constitutional rights 
of students in the Internet age.26 Packingham, while not related to student 
 
tweet-sports_n_3248326.html. 
19. Watch What You Tweet, supra note 18. 
20. Id.; Long Island Girl Suspended Over Anti-Bullying YouTube Video, CBS NEW YORK (May 
22, 2012, 7:29 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/05/22/l-i-girl-suspended-over-anti-
bullying-youtube-video/. 
21. Watch What You Tweet, supra note 18; Kery Murakami, Jessica Barba back to school after 
suspension, NEWSDAY (May 24, 2012, 10:17 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-
island/suffolk/jessica-barba-back-to-school-after-suspension-1.3737937. 
22. Watch What You Tweet, supra note 18; Rebecca Klein, 20 High Schoolers Suspended for 
Retweeting Gossip, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2014, 9:55 AM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/18/mckay-high-school-retweets_n_4981878.html. 
23. Hofheimer, supra note 14, at 987. See Daniel Marcus-Toll, Tinker Gone Viral: Diverging 
Threshold Tests for Analyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital Student Speech, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3395, 3423 (2014) (discussing the circuit courts’ conflicting ideas of what 
precedent governs off-campus student speech cases). 
24. See John T. Ceglia, The Disappearing Schoolhouse Gate: Applying Tinker in the Internet 
Age, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 939, 941 (2013) (stating Tinker is the federal courts of appeals’ preferred 
mode of analysis); Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3423 (discussing the circuit courts’ use of Tinker 
to analyze regulation of off-campus student speech); Rory Allen Weeks, The First Amendment, 
Public School Student, and the Need for Clear Limits on School Officials’ Authority Over Off-
Campus Student Speech, 46 GA. L. REV. 1157, 1182 (2012) (discussing the issues resulting from 
the federal appellate courts’ circuit split). 
25. See Samantha M. Levin, School Districts As Weathermen: The School’s Ability To 
Reasonably Forecast Substantial Disruption to the School Environment From Students’ Online 
Speech, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 859, 861 (2011) (arguing that Tinker thresholds result in an 
impermissible inconsistency for students’ First Amendment rights); see also infra, Part III.A 
(analyzing the impact the different threshold tests have on students’ First Amendment rights). 
26.  See Benjamin L. Ellison, More Connection, Less Protection? Off-Campus Speech with On-
Campus Impact, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 809, 842 (2010) (suggesting that a student’s intent for 
speech to reach campus should be included as a factor in assisting schools in determining whether 
to discipline a student for off-campus speech that disrupts the school environment). See infra Part 
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speech, provides important insight as to how schools can create social 
media policies that are constitutional while still maintaining order and 
safety in the schoolhouse.27 
In Part I, this Comment will provide the background of the Supreme 
Court student speech cases, the individual tests the Court incorporated to 
address these issues, and the approaches federal appellate courts have 
undertaken as a result.28 Part II will then discuss the Supreme Court’s 
rulings concerning social media, specifically the reasoning set forth in 
Reno v. ACLU and Packingham, in which the Court held the Internet and 
social media are protected forms of speech.29 Next, Part III will analyze 
the implications resulting from the differing threshold tests and individual 
school social media policies, as well as the “chilling effect” of this 
inconsistency.30 Lastly, Part IV will propose a framework for schools to 
follow when crafting social media policies that adheres to both Supreme 
Court precedent and the federal appellate courts’ approaches.31 
I.  BACKGROUND 
This Part begins by discussing the Supreme Court’s holding and 
reasoning in the seminal case on student speech rights, Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District.32 It then examines 
subsequent Supreme Court cases that limited students’ speech rights in 
schools.33 This Part then explains the “true threat” doctrine, which can be 
used to restrict certain types of student speech.34 Next, this Part analyzes 
the federal appellate courts’ approaches to examining the regulation of 
off-campus student speech.35 Finally, it presents examples of off-campus 
 
IV (providing a model threshold test for schools to implement while drafting policies pertaining to 
social media). 
27. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–38 (2017) (holding social media is 
protected speech). See infra Part III (discussing how Packingham can apply to student speech). 
28. See infra Part I (providing background on the seminal Supreme Court cases on student 
speech, the tests employed by the Court, and the federal appellate courts’ circuit split). 
29. See infra Part II (discussing the Supreme Court cases pertaining to the Internet and content-
based and content-neutral regulations). 
30. See infra Part III (analyzing the inconsistent application of students’ First Amendment rights 
due to the conflicting threshold tests undertaken by the federal appellate courts, critiquing school 
social media policies, and examining the chilling effect from these inconsistencies). 
31. See infra Part IV (proposing a model policy for schools to implement using elements 
articulated by the Supreme Court cases as well as the federal appellate courts). 
32. See infra Part I.A (discussing the reasoning and tests set forth in Tinker). 
33. See infra Part I.B (examining student speech cases subsequent to Tinker—Fraser, 
Kuhlmeier, and Morse—and discussing the tests and reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in 
each case). 
34. See infra Part I.C (analyzing the history and meaning of the “true threat” doctrine as applied 
to student speech). 
35. See infra Part I.D (discussing cases pertaining to off-campus student speech and tests for 
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social media use policies enacted by various school districts.36 
A.  Tinker Revolutionizes Students’ Speech Rights 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of student speech in 1969 in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.37 Tinker 
is among the most important cases involving students’ constitutional 
rights, and the first to announce that students enjoy First Amendment 
protection while in school.38 In December 1965, a group of students in 
Des Moines, Iowa, agreed they would wear black armbands to school as 
a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam War.39 When 
the school principals learned of the plan, they created a policy that stated 
any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, and refusal 
to do so would result in suspension.40 The students refused to remove the 
armbands and were subsequently suspended. In response, the students 
sued the school district for a violation of their First Amendment rights.41 
The District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, Central Division, 
dismissed the complaint and the students appealed.42 The Court of 
 
each federal court of appeals). 
36. See infra Part I.E (discussing the school districts’ policies regarding off-campus social 
media usage). 
37. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). Justice Abe Fortas delivered the opinion for a 7-2 majority, with 
concurring opinions by Justice Stewart and Justice White, and dissenting opinions by Justice Black 
and Justice Harlan. See generally JOHN W. JOHNSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS: 
TINKER V. DES MOINES AND THE 1960S (Univ. Press of Kansas 1997) (discussing the historical 
background during the time period Tinker was litigated). 
38. Richard Gyory, The Constitutional Rights of Public School Pupils, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 
201, 204 (1971) (stating “Tinker was the first unambiguous assertion by the Supreme Court of the 
constitutional rights of school children”). See generally Jill H. Krafte, Tinker’s Legacy: Freedom 
of the Press in Public High Schools, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 387 (1979) (discussing the impact the 
holding in Tinker had on public school students in 1969). 
39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
40. Id.; Brief for Petitioners at 8, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969) (No. 21), 1968 WL 112602, at *3–4: 
At this meeting, a policy prohibiting the wearing of arm bands in school was adopted by 
the principals, who decided that a student wearing an arm band to school would be asked 
to remove it, and that if the student refused he would be suspended but allowed to return 
without the arm band. 
41. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
42. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966). 
Chief Judge Stephenson delivered the opinion, holding that school officials must be given wide 
discretion to discipline students when there is a substantial interference to the rest of the school. 
The court provided substantial discussion on the effects of the Vietnam War, noting that the conflict 
“had become vehement in many localities.” Tinker, 258 F. Supp. at 973. See Jon G. Crawford, 
When Student Off-Campus Cyberspeech Permeates the Schoolhouse Gate: Are There Limits to 
Tinker’s Reach?, 45 URB. LAW. 235, 238 n.22 (2013) (“The court also acknowledged the 
contentious nature of the debate had been demonstrated during the school board’s hearing on the 
students’ suspensions. These facts were part of the calculus involved in the district court’s 
conclusion school officials had acted reasonably” when they prohibited wearing of arm bands). 
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the case en banc and affirmed 
without opinion.43 
Supreme Court Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, famously 
declared that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom 
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”44 The Court found that 
because the students’ armbands did not cause any disorder in the school 
and the armbands represented a political opinion, the school could not 
curtail the students’ First Amendment rights.45 However, the Court made 
clear that students’ free speech rights are not absolute while present on 
school grounds.46 Under Tinker, a school may restrict student speech 
when it materially and substantially disrupts the school environment or 
invades the rights of others.47 Importantly, the Court articulated that a 
school could regulate student speech in anticipation of a material and 
substantial disruption.48 But, mere apprehension of a disturbance or 
undifferentiated fear is not enough to justify discipline.49 Following 
Tinker, subsequent Supreme Court decisions created limits that further 
narrowed the scope of students’ rights.50 
 
43. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988, 988 (8th Cir. 1967). The Eighth 
Circuit was evenly divided. The case was argued before the Supreme Court on November 12, 1968, 
and the decision was delivered on February 24, 1969. Advocating for the plaintiffs, Dan Johnston 
declared during oral argument: “It’s important that the idea of freedom of dissent and inquiry and 
expression be maintained in the schools.” Oral Argument at 16:40, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (No. 21), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1968/21. 
44. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
45. Id. at 507–08. 
46. Id. at 513 (holding student speech rights are important, but when student speech 
substantially interferes with the school it is “not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of speech”). 
47. Id. See Bonnie Kellman, Tinkering with Tinker: Protecting the First Amendment in Public 
Schools, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 367, 376–84 (2009) (discussing the reasoning in Tinker and 
dissecting the material and substantial disruption test). 
48. [O]ur independent examination of the record fails to yield evidence that the school 
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially 
interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students. Even an 
official memorandum prepared after the suspension that listed the reasons for the ban on 
wearing the armbands made no reference to the anticipation of such disruption. 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
49. Id. at 508. See Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 533 (“Mere fear of disruption is not enough. 
The burden is on the school to prove the need for restricting student speech and the standard is a 
stringent one: there must be enough proof that the speech would ‘materially and substantially’ 
disrupt the school.”). 
50. See Scott A. Moss, The Overhyped Path from Tinker to Morse: How the Student Speech 
Cases Show the Limits of Supreme Court Decisions – for the Law and for the Litigants, 63 FLA. L. 
REV. 1407, 1423 (2011) (discussing the limiting trend of student speech rights from Tinker to 
Morse); see also infra Part I.B (discussing the limits placed on protection of student speech 
subsequent to Tinker). 
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B.  Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse Set Additional Limits on Student 
Speech 
In Bethel School District v. Fraser, the Supreme Court ruled that 
schools could prohibit speech that was considered vulgar, lewd, or plainly 
offensive because such speech was inconsistent with the fundamental 
values of public school education.51 In Fraser, a high school student 
delivered a vulgar speech during an assembly in which approximately 
600 students were present.52 The Court distinguished this speech from 
the speech in Tinker, holding that the penalties imposed in this case were 
unrelated to any political viewpoint.53 Chief Justice Burger, writing for 
the majority, emphasized language from Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker, 
which rejected the notion that the Constitution compels school authorities 
to surrender control of the school to the students.54 While the Court 
affirmed the student’s punishment, Justice Brennan, in a concurring 
opinion, explained that if the student had delivered the same speech 
outside the school, he could not be penalized just because government 
officials considered his language to be inappropriate.55 This set forth the 
idea that schools do not have the authority to punish speech occurring off-
campus; however, some courts in subsequent years have not adhered to 
this viewpoint and instead upheld punishments for off-campus speech 
that officials found inappropriate.56 
Following Fraser, in 1988, the Court addressed whether a school could 
censor or prohibit student newspaper articles discussing controversial 
topics in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.57 The Court held that 
 
51. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
52. Id. at 677. The assembly was part of a “school-sponsored educational program in self-
government” in which Fraser referred to his favored candidate in terms of an “elaborate, graphic 
and explicit sexual metaphor.” Id. at 677–78. Fraser gave the following speech: 
I know a man who is firm – he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is 
firm – but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman 
is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it 
to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts – he drives hard, pushing and pushing until 
finally – he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end – even the climax, for 
each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come 
between you and the best our high school can be. 
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
53. Id. at 685. 
54. Id. at 686 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting)). 
55. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring). See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 
(1971) (holding that a California criminal statute which prohibited disturbance of the peace by 
offensive conduct was inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth amendments, even if the public 
display or speech involved was immoral and offensive). 
56. See infra Part I.D (discussing cases when schools have limited speech occurring outside the 
schoolhouse gate). 
57. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988). The articles that were 
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the First Amendment does not require a school to relinquish control over 
content in a school-sponsored publication, so long as the school’s actions 
are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”58 The Court 
granted school officials the authority to censor speech when it could be 
reasonably inferred from the circumstances that parents and members of 
the public would consider the speech a product of the school itself.59 As 
the Court put another limit on the Tinker test, Justice Brennan’s dissent 
argued the majority’s holding created a classification of school 
censorship allowing heightened scrutiny for one category of speech but 
not another.60 Emphasizing the lack of consistency in student speech 
jurisprudence, the dissent advocated for Tinker to be applied across the 
board to preserve the sanctity of good precedent, while foreshadowing 
the lack of consistency that would plague future student speech cases.61 
The Court remained silent on student speech until 2007, when it 
decided Morse v. Frederick.62 Morse presented the question of whether 
schools could punish a student for speech promoting illegal drug use at 
an off-campus, school-sponsored activity.63 In Morse, a high school in 
Alaska suspended a student for waving a banner reading “Bong Hits 4 
 
censored dealt with three students’ experiences with pregnancy and the impact of divorce on 
students at the school. Id. at 263. 
58. Id. at 273. For a thorough discussion on the reasoning in Kuhlmeier, see Bruce C. Hafen, 
Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685 
(1988) (analyzing the Court’s decision in Kuhlmeier that the First Amendment permits educators 
to supervise student newspapers). 
59. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 276 (applying the Tinker substantial disruption test and noting that 
since a school newspaper is a public forum and produced from the schools’ resources, censorship 
could be justified to prevent substantial disruption of the school or violations of the law). 
60. Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting): 
On the one hand is censorship “to silence a student’s personal expression that happens 
to occur on the school premises” . . . [o]n the other hand is censorship of expression that 
arises in the context of “school-sponsored . . . expressive activities that students, parents, 
and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school.” 
See Scott Andrew Felder, Stop the Presses: Censorship and the High School Journalist, 29 J.L. & 
EDUC. 433, 446 (2000) (“It has been suggested that censorship could never be reasonably related 
to legitimate pedagogical concerns because censorship itself is an educationally unsound 
practice.”). 
61. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 283–84. See May, supra note 14, at 1110 (stating that Justice 
Brennan’s dissenting argument “highlights how the Court’s subsequent cases, rather than 
reaffirming Tinker, merely crafted new exceptions or categories of analysis for student speech”); 
Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of Student 
Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 840 (2008) (“Commentators generally hailed Tinker, 
and deplored what they saw as narrowing of it by Fraser and Kuhlmeier.”). 
62. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). See Shannon L. Noder, Comment, Morse v. 
Frederick: Students’ First Amendment Rights Restricted Again, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 859 (2009) 
(analyzing the facts, holding, reasoning, and impact of Morse). 
63. Morse, 551 U.S. at 400. 
728 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  49 
Jesus” during a school-sponsored event on the basis that promoting illegal 
drug use was against school policy.64 Despite the event occurring off-
campus, the Court held that because it happened during school hours at a 
school-sanctioned event, it fell within the school’s scope of authority.65 
The Court reiterated that the Tinker analysis is not absolute, limiting 
its application to speech that expresses fear, disturbance, or an unpopular 
viewpoint; therefore, Tinker did not apply to the speech at issue, which 
posed a more serious societal danger.66 Moreover, the Court reasoned that 
Fraser was inapplicable, implying that the category of speech that falls 
under a Fraser analysis includes only lewd, inappropriate, or sexually 
suggestive speech during school hours.67 Kuhlmeier also did not apply 
because it was unreasonable to suggest that the school supported the 
display of the banner.68 Morse, therefore, expanded schools’ authority to 
regulate speech that promotes illegal activity when it occurs off-campus, 
but at a school-sponsored event.69 The Supreme Court has not heard a 
case regarding student speech since Morse.70 
C.  The “True Threat” Limitation on Student Speech 
Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse stand as the foundational 
student speech cases, but courts have incorporated another analysis to 
determine the limits of First Amendment protection of student speech that 
occurs outside of school.71 The “true threat” doctrine was first articulated 
 
64. Id. at 397–98. 
65. Id. at 400–01; Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet: Student Speech and the First 
Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 370–80 (2007) (analyzing the majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions in Morse and each opinion’s reasoning). 
66. Morse, 551 U.S. at 407–08 (explaining the drug abuse problem plaguing the nation’s youth 
and describing how a Tinker analysis cannot apply to situations posing these grave dangers). See 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that speech that 
merely causes a fear of a substantial disruption is not enough to punish a student). 
67. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405. See Denning & Taylor, supra note 61, at 861 (reviewing the Court’s 
interpretation of Fraser in its decision in Morse). 
68. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405–06. 
69. Id. See Linda Greenhouse, Vote Against Banner Shows Divide on Speech in Schools, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/26/washington/26speech.html 
(critiquing the conflicting Court in Morse); Jason Harrow, Commentary on Morse v. Frederick, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2007, 2:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/06/commentary-on-
morse-v-frederick/ (discussing the categories Chief Justice Roberts used in rendering his decision 
in Morse, specifically noting that his opinion made sense as a matter of public policy, but failed to 
make sense of the conflicting student speech holdings). 
70. See Krafte, supra note 38, at 399 (stating Morse was the last student speech case on which 
the Supreme Court ruled). 
71. See infra Part I.C (discussing the “true threat” doctrine). See also The Editorial Board, What 
is a True Threat on Facebook?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/what-is-a-true-threat-on-facebook.html (arguing 
that what constitutes a true threat on Facebook is subjective). 
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by the Supreme Court in 1969 in Watts v. United States, which held 
threatening speech about the president was protected as political 
speech.72 While the Court made clear that speech that amounts to a “true 
threat” is outside the protection of the First Amendment, it failed to define 
what speech constitutes a true threat.73 
Justice O’Connor in Virginia v. Black interpreted Watts to encompass 
statements threatening violence to a particular individual or group.74 
Justice Alito in a dissenting opinion in Elonis v. United States defined a 
“true threat” as a statement that expresses an intention to inflict evil, 
injury, or damage on another.75 Thus, for speech to be considered a true 
threat, one must purposely or knowingly communicate an intention to 
inflict unlawful harm on a person or persons.76 
The “true threat” doctrine, while not a bright-line rule, has been used 
by courts to address student speech issues.77 However, the doctrine has 
been split into two tests—the reasonable speaker test and the reasonable 
recipient test.78 The reasonable speaker test looks at the level of intent 
 
72. 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam); see Andrew P. Stanner, Toward an Improved True 
Threat Doctrine for Student Speakers, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 390 (2006) (discussing Watts and 
the beginning of the “true threat” doctrine). 
73. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 283, 288 (2001): 
The only Supreme Court case to elaborate on the true threats exception to the First 
Amendment is United States v. Watts, which made clear that . . . “[w]hat is a threat must 
be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.” However, the Supreme 
Court did not provide a specific test for making this distinction. 
74. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
75. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2014 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2382 (1976)). 
76. Compare Black, 538 U.S. at 349 (providing Justice O’Connor’s definition of a true threat), 
with Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2014 (Alito, J., dissenting) (providing Justice Alito’s definition of a true 
threat). 
77. See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004) (using a “true 
threat” analysis to hold that a student’s drawing was protected speech under the First Amendment); 
Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002) (using a “true threat” 
analysis to uphold the expulsion of a student who threatened the life of his classmate); 
Commonwealth v. Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967 (Mass. 2001) (using a “true threat” analysis to uphold 
disciplinary action of a 12-year-old student who drew a picture of shooting his teacher). For more 
analysis and examples of cases in which a “true threat” analysis was used, see Stanner, supra note 
72, at 390. 
78. See, e.g., United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying an objective 
test that considers whether a reasonable recipient familiar with the context would interpret the 
statement as a threat); Porter, 393 F.3d at 617–18 (conducting the “true threat” analysis from the 
recipient’s perspective, but ultimately not coming to a conclusion on the accuracy of a recipient- or 
speaker-based test); United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that 
a true threat is one that a reasonable recipient familiar with the communication would find 
threatening); Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622–23 (8th Cir. 2002) (using 
the reasonable recipient standard); United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(using the specific recipient and surrounding context to determine a true threat); United States v. 
730 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  49 
from the speaker’s point of view.79 Under this test, the speaker must have 
knowingly made a statement that expresses an intention to inflict harm 
upon another.80 In contrast, the reasonable recipient test looks at the level 
of intent from the listener’s point of view, asking if an ordinary recipient 
who is familiar with the context of the statement would interpret it as a 
threat.81 
D.  The Federal Appellate Courts’ Circuit Split: When, if Ever, Can 
Schools Regulate Off-Campus Speech? 
The federal appellate courts are split on how to analyze students’ First 
Amendment rights when their speech occurs outside the schoolhouse.82 
Absent a clear articulation and ruling from the Supreme Court, lower 
courts have been left in the dark, and have inconsistently applied the 
aforementioned tests to analyze the issue of off-campus speech.83 The 
majority of federal appellate courts apply some variation of Tinker to 
students’ off-campus speech, but differ in their applications and use of 
the exceptions set forth in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse.84 
The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits apply the foreseeability 
threshold to the Tinker test.85 The Third Circuit also applies the 
foreseeability threshold to Tinker, but tweaks its test to focus on the 
 
Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1994) (using a reasonable recipient familiar with the context 
standard); United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1992) (looking to what the 
reasonable person would conclude); United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (analyzing a true threat from the speaker’s perspective); United States v. Schneider, 910 
F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying the reasonable recipient standard); United States v. 
Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 619 (10th Cir. 1984) (using a reasonable speaker standard regarding 
statements to the President of the United States). 
79. Doe, 306 F.3d at 623. 
80. United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991). 
81. United States v. Masionet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973). While the true threat 
jurisprudence is vast, this Comment focuses its discussion on “true threat” analysis used in student 
speech cases. See infra Part IV (incorporating the “true threat” approach into a model school social 
media policy). 
82. See William Calve, Comment, The Amplified Need for Supreme Court Guidance on Student 
Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 377, 386 (2016) (analyzing the circuit split 
between federal appellate courts); Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3420 (dissecting the differing 
approaches that result in inconsistent application of Tinker at the federal appellate level). 
83. See Calve, supra note 82 at 386 (“Circuit courts have continuously invoked Tinker to 
regulate off-campus cyberspeech, particularly when the speech is violent or threatening, but the 
method of application is inconsistent across the country.”); infra Part III.A (discussing the impact 
of the inconsistent Tinker threshold tests on students). 
84. Compare Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying the 
reasoning set forth in Kuhlmeier with a Tinker analysis), with Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 
728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasizing Tinker’s application when dealing with speech that is 
illegal or threatening, as articulated in Morse). 
85. See infra Parts I.D.1, 5, 6 (examining the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit’s “reasonable 
foreseeability” threshold). 
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student’s intent.86 The Fourth Circuit applies a “sufficient nexus” 
threshold to Tinker, while the Eleventh Circuit applies a “true threat” test, 
in addition to a traditional Tinker analysis.87 The Ninth Circuit declines 
to apply any of these approaches, and extends Tinker only when faced 
with an identifiable threat of school violence,88 while the Fifth Circuit’s 
approach is flexible to accommodate the specific facts before it.89 Absent 
an express ruling from the Supreme Court, the lower courts will continue 
to rule inconsistently.90 
For example, while the Third Circuit’s “intent” threshold of its Tinker 
analysis led to the conclusion that a student-created social media account 
defaming the school’s principal was protected speech,91 the Fourth 
Circuit’s “sufficient nexus” Tinker threshold led to the conclusion that a 
student’s social media comments about a fellow student were outside 
First Amendment protection.92 Both decisions were handed down in 
2011, thus eliminating any variables related to societal interests or 
viewpoints of the time that might explain such inconsistent rulings.93 The 
next Section will break down the various circuits’ approaches in  detail, 
looking at case examples to better understand the discrepancies.94 
 
86. See infra Part I.D.2 (discussing the Third Circuit’s intent approach). See also Layshock ex 
rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (using the intent precursor 
to Tinker). 
87. See infra Parts I.D.3, 8 (providing background information on the threshold tests the Fourth 
Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit use, respectively). Compare Kowalski, 653 F.3d at 567 (using a 
“sufficient nexus” threshold to Tinker), with Boim v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 985 
(11th Cir. 2007) (approaching off-campus student speech cases using a traditional Tinker 
approach). 
88. See infra Part I.D.7 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s ‘faced with an identifiable threat of 
violence’ approach); see also Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 
2013) (articulating the Ninth Circuit’s test). 
89. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 421 (5th Cir. 2015). See generally Shaver, 
supra note 15, at 1573 (analyzing the approach by the Fifth Circuit in relation to the other circuits 
and the need for Supreme Court guidance to combat this inconsistency). 
90. Calve, supra note 82, at 383–84 (discussing the inconsistent approaches of the circuit 
courts). This Comment focuses on student online speech, but for the purposes of identifying each 
circuit’s approach to off-campus student speech, cases that do not address online speech specifically 
are included to demonstrate the test that the circuits will potentially use to rule in student social 
media cases. 
91. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying a 
Tinker analysis but focusing on the student’s intent). 
92. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying a “sufficient 
nexus” threshold test to Tinker). 
93. Id.; Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920. For a look back on the big stories of 2011, see 2011: Year in 
Review, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/la-2011-year-in-review-gallery-
storygallery.html. 
94. See infra Parts II.D.1–9 (examining the circuit court approaches and cases decided). 
732 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  49 
1.  Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit incorporates an additional threshold into the Tinker 
analysis to decide off-campus student speech cases.95 The court first 
looks to see whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will reach 
school grounds, then applies Tinker to determine if the speech is likely to 
cause a material and substantial disruption.96 The Second Circuit first 
applied this test in 2007, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the 
Weedsport Central School District.97 In Wisniewski, the court addressed 
whether a student could be disciplined for sharing a drawing on his social 
media profile suggesting a teacher be shot and killed.98 The court 
expressly disaffirmed using the “true threat” approach to determine if 
discipline was permissible, declaring that school administrators’ 
authority is beyond what the true threat standard allows.99 The court 
announced that if off-campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of 
substantial disruption within a school, the school has the authority to 
discipline the student.100 
A year later, in Doninger v. Niehoff, the court addressed whether a 
student could be disciplined for writing a blog post outside school hours 
that degraded the school’s administration and encouraged peers to harass 
them.101 The court used the reasoning set forth in Wisniewski to hold that 
 
95. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. 
of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007). As illustrated by these two cases, 
the Second Circuit uses a reasonable foreseeability threshold to decide off-campus student speech 
cases. 
96. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39 (“We have recognized that off-campus conduct can create a 
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a school. . . .”) (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 
F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir.1979)). 
97. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 34. 
98. Id. at 35. The eighth-grade student was using AOL Instant Messaging software on his 
parents’ home computer. The software enables users to display an icon, serving as an identifier of 
the sender of a message. The icon was the drawing at issue, which depicted a “pistol firing a bullet 
at a person’s head, above which were dots representing splattered blood. Beneath the drawing 
appeared the words ‘Kill Mr. VanderMolen.’” Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. 
99. Id. at 38. See Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2013); infra 
Part I.D.7 (explaining the Ninth Circuit’s “identifiable violence” approach to decide a similar fact 
pattern). 
100. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39. The court used this reasoning from a footnote in a case decided 
thirty years prior. In Thomas v. Board of Education, the court wrote “[w]e can, of course, envision 
a case in which a group of students incites substantial disruption within the school from some 
remote locale.” 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979). 
101. 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008). The blog post at issue is as follows: 
jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. here is an email that we sent out 
to a ton of people and asked them to forward to everyone in their address book to help 
get support for jamfest. basically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is getting a 
TON of phone calls and emails and such. we have so much support and we really 
appriciate [sic] it. however, she got pissed off and decided to just cancel the whole thing 
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because the blog post directly pertained to a school-sponsored event and 
encouraged other students to harass principals and teachers, it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the student’s speech would reach the 
school.102 The court then concluded that the speech caused a substantial 
disruption, and thus was not entitled to First Amendment protection.103 
The Second Circuit has not addressed off-campus speech since 2008.104 
2.  Third Circuit 
While the Third Circuit also applies a Tinker approach to off-campus 
speech, it tweaks the test and focuses on whether the student intended for 
his or her speech to cause a disruption in the school.105 In J.S. ex rel. 
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, an eighth-grade student was 
suspended after he created a fake social media account that ridiculed the 
school’s principal.106 The Third Circuit held that Tinker could apply to 
off-campus speech.107 In contrast with the Second Circuit’s approach, the 
court looks to the student’s intent to determine whether it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the speech would cause a substantial disruption in the 
school.108 Adding yet another threshold to Tinker, the court noted that 
because the student did not intend for the speech to reach the school, it 
could not be reasonably foreseeable that her content would cause a 
 
all together. anddd [sic] so basically we aren’t going to have it at all, but in the slightest 
chance we do it is going to be after the talent show on may 18. 
Id. 
102. Id. at 348. See Allison E. Hayes, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger v. 
Niehoff Shows the Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43 AKRON 
L. REV. 247, 271 (2010) (analyzing the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Doninger). 
103. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 49. 
104. Although the Second Circuit has not addressed a similar case, and thus has not had the 
opportunity to apply the reasonably foreseeable threshold to the Tinker test, the court ruled on a 
student speech case in 2001. See generally R.O. ex rel. Oschorn v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., 645 F.3d 
533 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that under the exceptions to Tinker set forth in Fraser and Hazelwood, 
the school acted reasonably in preventing the distribution of a school newspaper that contained 
drawings of stick figures in sexual positions, qualifying as “lewd”). 
105. Compare J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (applying an “intent” threshold to Tinker), with Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45 (applying a 
“reasonably foreseeable” threshold to Tinker). 
106. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920. 
107. Id. at 927 (rejecting the argument that Tinker could not reach off-campus conduct). See 
Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3423 (discussing the tests for off-campus student speech); First 
Amendment – Student Speech – Third Circuit Applies Tinker to Off-Campus Student Speech. – J.S. 
ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1064 (2012) (discussing the majority and dissenting opinions of Synder). 
108. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 928. See Scott Dranoff, Tinker-ing with Speech Categories: Solving 
the Off-Campus Student Speech Problem with a Categorical Approach and a Comprehensive 
Framework, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 649, 659–61(2013) (discussing the “intent” approaches 
analyzed by scholars and the federal appellate courts). 
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substantial disruption.109 Although the court held that this speech could 
not be subject to discipline, it warned of potential conflicting holdings 
that would unduly restrict off-campus speech.110 
On the same day Snyder was decided, the Third Circuit handed down 
a similar holding in Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School 
District.111 In Layshock, a student was disciplined for creating a social 
media profile ridiculing the school’s principal.112 The court held that the 
school did not have the authority to discipline the student because the 
conduct occurred outside school hours, the student did not intend for the 
speech to reach the school, and it was not foreseeable that the speech 
would cause a material and substantial disruption.113 Additionally, the 
court warned that schools may only punish expressive conduct that occurs 
off-campus under very limited circumstances.114 
3.  Fourth Circuit 
The approach taken by the Fourth Circuit incorporates an additional 
threshold to decide off-campus student speech issues.115 In 2011, the 
 
109. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 930 (noting the differences between the intentions of the students in 
Doninger, Lowery, and LaVine compared to the intentions of the student in the case at bar. The 
court wrote, “[she] did not intend for the speech to reach the school – in fact, she took specific steps 
to make the profile “private” so that only her friends could access it”). See Doninger v. Niehoff, 
527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the student intended for the speech to reach the 
schoolhouse); Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 599 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that the students 
intended for the speech to reach the administration); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 
985 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the student’s intention was to cause a disruption in the school 
because he showed his teacher a disturbing poem). 
110. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 933 (stating “an opposite holding would significantly broaden school 
districts’ authority over student speech”). 
111. For more information regarding the procedural history of the Layshock and Snyder cases, 
see Matthew Beatus, Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 785, 793 n.59 (2011–12) (stating “[b]ecause the cases were so factually similar and confusion 
ensued, the Third Circuit vacated both opinions and held a rehearing of the consolidated cases en 
banc on June 3, 2010. The Third Circuit published its opinions following the consolidated en banc 
rehearing on June 13, 2011”). 
112. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc). For a rendition of the facts in Layshock, see Beatus, supra note 111, at 790: 
Layshock copied-and-pasted a picture of Trosch from the school district’s website for 
use in the MySpace profile and falsely answered the survey questions that MySpace asks 
when users are creating profiles. Some of the information that Layshock supplied in 
creating the profile was as follows: “Birthday: too drunk to remember”; “Are you a 
health freak: big steroid freak . . .” 
113. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 213. In a concurring opinion, Judge Jordan argued that any off-
campus speech that caused a substantial disruption is punishable, an issue which the majority did 
not address. Id. at 219–20 (Jordan, J., concurring). 
114. Id. at 219. 
115. See Gyory, supra note 38, at 224–25 (discussing the different approaches the circuits take 
in student speech cases). Compare Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 577 (4th Cir. 
2011) (using a sufficient nexus test with the Tinker threshold), and Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 
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Fourth Circuit held in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools that the 
school had authority to discipline a student who created a social media 
web page to post hateful messages about a classmate.116 The court 
introduced the “sufficient nexus” test, which addresses whether the off-
campus conduct is sufficiently connected to the school’s pedagogical 
interests to warrant disciplinary action.117 The court held that because the 
student could have reasonably expected the speech to reach the school, as 
a majority of the web page’s members were peers, the nexus between the 
conduct and the school’s interests was sufficiently strong.118 
4.  Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit first addressed off-campus student speech in 1972, 
shortly after Tinker was decided, in Shanley v. Northeast Independent 
School District.119 In Shanley, students were suspended for distributing 
an off-campus newspaper.120 The court analyzed the speech under Tinker 
but held the circumstances did not justify the suspensions of the 
students.121 A year later, the court addressed a similar question in 
 
41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008) (using the reasonably foreseeable and Tinker tests for off-campus speech), 
with J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 928 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(using the reasonably foreseeable and Tinker approaches, with emphasis on intent). 
116. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567. The student was suspended for five days for creating a MySpace 
page titled “S.A.S.H.,” which stood for “Students Against Shay’s Herpes,” referring to a fellow 
classmate. The student invited over 100 people to join the “hate website,” in which students posted 
hateful comments and ridiculing photographs depicting their animosity toward the fellow student. 
Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567–68. 
117. Id. at 573. See Hofheimer, supra note 14, at 984 (discussing the “sufficient nexus” 
threshold employed by the Fourth Circuit in Kowalski). 
118. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573; Hofheimer, supra note 14, at 984 (“The court found . . . a 
sufficient nexus between the speech and the school’s pedagogical goals in protecting its students 
from such assaultive speech.”). 
119. 462 F.2d 960, 960 (5th Cir. 1972). 
120. Id. The school justified the suspension under a school policy that prohibited the distribution 
of any material without the express consent of the school. Id. at 964. The newspaper, titled 
Awakening, was authored by five students during out-of-school hours and without any school 
support. The students distributed the newspapers before and after school, near but not on school 
property. Although some newspapers did turn up at the school, the students did not encourage any 
distribution of the papers during school hours. The court found that “[t]here was absolutely no 
disruption of class that resulted from distribution of the newspaper, nor were there any disturbances 
whatsoever attributable to the distribution. It was acknowledged by all concerned with this case 
that the students who passed out the newspapers did so politely and in orderly fashion.” Shanley, 
462 F.2d at 964. 
121. Id. The court found the suspension was unjustified because no disruption occurred or was 
reasonably foreseeable to occur. Shanley was one of the first decisions regarding off-campus speech 
post Tinker. In its decision, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that nothing in Tinker allows the 
prohibition of off-campus speech that does not disrupt the schoolhouse and “it is not at all unusual 
to allow the geographical location of the actor to determine the constitutional protection that should 
be afforded to his or her acts.” Shanley, 462 F.2d at 974. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (applying the material and substantial disruption test). 
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Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District.122 Incorporating the 
same reasoning as Shanley, the court held the students’ suspensions for 
distributing an off-campus newspaper were not justified under Tinker.123 
However, in 2001, the Fifth Circuit changed its approach to off-
campus speech in Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board.124 In Porter, 
the court expressed discontent with applying Tinker to off-campus 
speech.125 The court held that school administrators did not have the 
authority to punish a student for a drawing, which depicted a violent 
siege, because he did not intend for this speech to reach the school.126 In 
contrast with its approach in Shanley and Sullivan, the Fifth Circuit 
tweaked its Tinker analysis to fit the facts before it, foreshadowing the 
approach the court would take decades later in addressing online off-
campus speech.127 
Shanley, Sullivan, and Porter dealt with speech that occurred off-
campus, but not in cyberspace.128 In 2015, the Fifth Circuit, en banc, 
 
122. 475 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). 
123. Paul’s conduct can hardly be characterized as pristine, passive acts of protest “akin to 
pure speech” involved in Tinker. Rather, Paul defied Mr. Cotton’s request that he stop selling 
newspapers, persisted in returning to the campus during the initial six-day suspension period, 
and twice shouted profanity at Mr. Cotton within the hearing of others. Paul’s reappearance 
on the campus and continued sale of the newspapers on October 26 only served to exacerbate 
the situation. 
Id. at 1075. The court implied that selling the newspapers in an isolated situation would have met 
the level of constitutional protection afforded by the First Amendment. Id. See Waldman, supra 
note 12, at 602 (noting that it was the conduct of the student, not the newspaper, that warranted the 
suspension). 
124. Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 2004). The court discussed 
the inconsistencies between courts, and called for the federal circuits to “more clearly delineate the 
boundary line between off-campus speech entitled to greater First Amendment protection, and on-
campus speech subject to greater regulation.” Id. at 619–20. 
125. Id. at 620 (noting that “[b]ecause Adam’s drawing was composed off-campus, displayed 
only to members of his own household, stored off-campus, and not purposefully taken by him to 
[the school] or publicized in a way certain to result in its appearance at [the school], we have found 
that the drawing is protected by the First Amendment”). 
126. Id. at 611. The sketch depicted his school under siege by machinery, contained obscenities 
and racial epithets, and showed the school principal under attack. The sketch was discovered by 
school officials two years later due to the student’s younger brother bringing the sketch pad to 
school for a reason wholly unrelated to the sketch. The student was subsequently enrolled in an 
alternative school. Porter, 393 F.3d at 611–12. See Mary Jo Roberts, Porter v. Ascension Parish 
School Board: Drawing in the Contours of First Amendment Protection for Student Art and 
Expression, 52 LOY. L. REV. 467 (2006) (discussing the factual underpinnings and reasoning in 
Porter). 
127. Compare Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(applying a traditional Tinker analysis), with Shanley v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 967 
(5th Cir. 1972) (applying a traditional Tinker analysis a year before Sullivan was decided). 
128. Porter, 393 F.3d at 619 (discussing student speech concerning a violent drawing); Sullivan, 
475 F.2d at 1076 (discussing student speech concerning a newspaper); Shanley, 462 F.2d at 965 
(discussing student speech concerning a newspaper). 
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addressed the issue of when a school could discipline a student for his or 
her off-campus, online speech in Bell v. Itawamba County School 
Board.129 The majority opinion held that Tinker analysis applied, but 
failed to adopt or reject approaches advocated by other circuits.130 The 
court simply fashioned a Tinker threshold test limited to the facts of the 
case.131 Thus, the court held that Tinker can apply to off-campus, online 
speech when a student directs the speech at the school and school officials 
understand it as harassing a teacher.132 Answering these questions in the 
affirmative, the court then concluded that the discipline was justified 
because the school officials could foresee the speech would cause a 
material and substantial disruption in the school.133 
5.  Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach to this issue is similar to the Second 
Circuit because both add a “reasonably foreseeable” threshold to the 
Tinker test.134 In 1970, the Seventh Circuit addressed its first case 
pertaining to off-campus student speech in Scoville v. Board of Education 
of Joliet Township.135 In Scoville, the court used a Tinker analysis to 
 
129. 799 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2015). In Bell, a student recorded a rap song outside of school 
and posted the audio on his Facebook profile. Id. The rap made derogatory reference to school 
teachers, accused coaches of sexual harassment, and was full of obscene and vulgar language. Id. 
The student was suspended and brought suit against the school district for violation of his First 
Amendment rights. Id. at 389. See Shaver, supra note 15, at 1573 (“[T]he en banc panel of the court 
was highly divided. Of the twelve judges in the majority, six judges authored or joined in separately 
written concurring opinions. Four judges dissented from the decision, and each of the dissenting 
judges wrote a separate dissenting opinion.”). 
130. Bell, 799 F.3d at 396 (stating “[f]urther, in holding Tinker applies to the off-campus speech 
in this instance, because such determinations are heavily influenced by the facts in each matter, we 
decline: to adopt any rigid standard in this instance . . .”). 
131. Id.; Katherine D. Landfried, Bell v. Itawamba County School Board: The Need for a 
Balance of Freedom and Authority, 36 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 193, 202 (2017) (articulating the 
reasoning the court used to identify the correct threshold under which to consider the facts and 
concluding that “via process of elimination, the court determines that Bell’s speech should be 
analyzed under Tinker”). 
132. Bell, 799 F.3d at 386. For more discussion of the test articulated in Bell, see Margaret 
Malloy, Bell v. Itawamba County School Board: Testing the Limits of First Amendment Protection 
of Off-Campus Student Speech, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1251, 1264–67 (2016). 
133. Bell, 799 F.3d at 399. 
134. Although both circuits use thresholds that rely on foreseeability, the Second Circuit looks 
at whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the conduct would create a risk of substantial disruption 
in the school, and the Seventh Circuit looks at whether the school officials could reasonably forecast 
the conduct would cause a substantial disruption in school. Compare Wisniewski v. Board of Educ. 
of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting the reasonably foreseeable 
to cause a substantial disruption threshold), with Scoville v. Bd. of Ed. of Joliet Twp. High Sch. 
Dist. 204, Will Cty., State of Ill., 425 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1970) (discussing whether school 
officials could “reasonably forecast” the conduct would create a substantial disruption). 
135. Scoville, 425 F.2d at 15. See generally ALAN GORR, PROBLEMS IN TODAY’S EDUCATION 
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determine whether high school students who wrote critical off-campus 
newspaper articles about school policies could be disciplined.136 The 
court held that because school officials could not reasonably foresee that 
the publication would substantially interfere with the school, the 
suspension violated the students’ First Amendment rights.137 
The Seventh Circuit again addressed the issue in 1998, in Boucher v. 
School Board of the School District of Greenfield.138 The court held that 
Tinker authorized the expulsion of a student who wrote an off-campus 
newspaper article because the school board could reasonably foresee a 
material and substantial disruption in school.139 
6.  Eighth Circuit 
Similar to the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Eighth Circuit applies 
the Tinker test with the extra foreseeability requirement.140 In 2011, the 
Eighth Circuit reviewed two off-campus speech cases dealing with the 
Internet.141 D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District #60 dealt with a 
student who sent instant messages from his home computer that referred 
to shooting other students at school.142 The court concluded that the 
statements were not protected under a “true threat” analysis, nor under 
Tinker, because it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would 
cause a substantial disruption in the school.143 
 
235–55 (1973) (discussing the arguments of the respondent and the petitioner in Scoville). 
136. Scoville, 425 F.3d at 17. 
137. Id. See Levin, supra note 25, at 871 (discussing generally the “reasonably forecast” 
standard that was employed by the Seventh Circuit in Scoville). 
138. 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1988). 
139. Id. at 822–23. The newspaper article provided instructions on how to hack school 
computers. The court held that because the content of the article was threatening to the schools’ 
resources, and the article was distributed on school grounds, “a reasonable forecast of disruption is 
all that would be required of the [school] board” in order to uphold the expulsion. Boucher, 134 
F.3d at 828. 
140. Compare Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (applying a reasonably foreseeable threshold to Tinker), with Scoville, 425 F.2d at 16 
(applying a “reasonably forecast” threshold to Tinker, from the administrator’s point of view), and 
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 760 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying 
a reasonably foreseeable threshold from the point of view of a reasonable person). 
141. Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 756; S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 
771 (8th Cir. 2011). 
142. Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 758 (quoting the transcript of the messages: “C.M. asks D.J.M. 
‘what kidna gun did your friend have again?’ D.J.M. responds ‘357 magnum.’ C.M. then replies, 
‘haha would you shoot [L.] or let her live?’ D.J.M. answers ‘i still like her so I would say let her 
live.’ C.M. follows up by asking, ‘well who would you shoot then lol,’ to which D.J.M. responds  
‘everyone else’”). 
143. Id. at 764 (in analyzing the speech under the “true threat” doctrine, the court places special 
emphasis on the speaker’s intent, quoting Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 627 
(8th Cir. 2002), which defined a true threat as a “statement that a reasonable recipient would have 
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In S.J.W ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District, the court 
held that off-campus student speech that causes a substantial disruption 
in school is not protected.144 In Wilson, students were suspended for 
writing an online blog that contained offensive, sexually explicit, racist, 
and degrading comments about other classmates.145 The court reasoned 
that because the speech was targeted at the school and it was reasonably 
foreseeable that it would cause a substantial disruption, Tinker applied, 
regardless of where the speech occurred.146 As illustrated by these two 
cases, the Eighth Circuit expressly adopts both a “true threat” and a 
Tinker approach to off-campus student speech.147 
7.  Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit’s off-campus student speech jurisprudence, and 
decisions regarding what rule should govern, contradicts other circuits’ 
interpretations of Tinker.148 In LaVine v. Blaine School District, the court 
held that schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus 
speech that meets the requirements of Tinker.149 However, twelve years 
later, in Wynar v. Douglas County, the court clarified that Tinker could 
only be applied to off-campus speech if there is an identifiable threat of 
school violence.150 The Wynar court held that students sending 
 
interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to cause harm”). See John L. Hughes III, Social 
Networking and Student Safety: Balancing Student First Amendment Rights and Disciplining 
Threatening Speech, 7 UMASS. L. REV. 208, 227 (2012) (arguing that the Hannibal decision is 
“illustrative of recent court decisions regarding threatening student speech, as it utilizes both the 
Watts true threat and Tinker tests in coming to its decision”). 
144. 696 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 2011). 
145. See id. at 733 (indicating that the blog posts “contained a variety of offensive and racist 
comments as well as sexually explicit and degrading comments about particular female classmates, 
whom they identified by name. The racist posts discussed fights at Lee’s Summit North and mocked 
black students. A third student added another racist post”). 
146. Id. at 778. The court devotes substantial discussion to the other circuits that have applied 
Tinker to off-campus speech; specifically, the Second Circuit’s ruling in Doninger v. Niehoff, the 
Fourth Circuit in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, and the Third Circuit in J.S. v. Blue 
Mountain School District. See supra Part I.D.1, 2, 3 for further analysis of those cases. 
147. Wilson, 696 F.3d at 776; Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 759. See supra Part I.C (discussing the 
“true threat” test). 
148. Compare LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist, 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Tinker 
applies to off-campus speech), with Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 
2013) (holding that Tinker cannot apply to all off-campus speech). 
149. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 984. The poem at issue depicted a student’s wish to shoot classmates. 
The court opened by stating, “[t]his case has its genesis in a high school student’s poem which led 
to his temporary, emergency expulsion from school. It arises against a backdrop of tragic school 
shootings. . . .” Id. For a look at the issue of true threats, freedom of speech, and school shootings, 
see Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools in a Post-Columbine World: Check Your Speech 
Rights at the Schoolhouse Metal Detector, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 739, 740 (2000). 
150. Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069 (“Here we make explicit what was implicit in LaVine: when faced 
with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may take disciplinary action in response to 
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threatening instant messages constituted a threat of school violence, and 
thus the speech was not protected by the First Amendment.151 However, 
the court was clear that absent a ruling from the Supreme Court, there is 
not a one-size-fits-all approach to off-campus speech.152 
8.  Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit applied a Tinker and true threat approach in Boim 
v. Fulton County School District.153 In Boim, school authorities expelled 
a student after they discovered a notebook entry describing a dream in 
which the student shot and killed a teacher.154 While the writing took 
place off campus, the court held the school was justified in punishing the 
student under the “true threat” and Tinker tests.155 Unlike the Third 
Circuit in similar circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit did not place 
emphasis on the student’s intent, declaring the student’s intention to keep 
the notebook entry private immaterial.156 While not dealing directly with 
online speech, the court’s ruling could imply that both Tinker and “true 
 
off-campus speech that meets the requirements of Tinker.”). 
151. Id. at 1064. The threatening instant messages consisted of “bragging about his weapons, 
threatening to shoot specific classmates, [and] intimating that he would ‘take out’ other people at a 
school shooting on a specific date.” Id. at 1065. The court applies the facts to the threshold tests the 
other circuits have used, but declines to adopt any bright-line test for approaching off campus 
speech, writing: “given the subject and addressees of Landon’s messages, it is hard to imagine how 
their nexus to the school could have been more direct; for the same reasons, it should have been 
reasonably foreseeable to Landon that his messages would reach campus.” Id. at 1069. See 
generally May, supra note 14, at 1110 (discussing the circuit split regarding which test to apply to 
off-campus speech). 
152. See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1064 (stating “we are reluctant to try to craft a one-size fits all 
approach”); Kellman, supra note 47, at 374 (discussing the problems arising due to the Court’s 
silence on the issue of off-campus student speech). 
153. 494 F.3d 978, 985 (11th Cir. 2007). 
154. Id. The notebook entry was titled “Dream” and vividly depicted the student shooting her 
teacher. Id. at 980. School administrators discovered it after the student’s art teacher confiscated it 
in class. Id. at 984. 
155. Id. The court writes about the importance of maintaining safety in schools, especially after 
Columbine, stating: “Thus, in this climate of increasing school violence and government oversight, 
and in light of schools’ undisputedly compelling interest in acting quickly to prevent violence on 
school property, especially during regular school hours, we must conclude that the defendants did 
not violate Rachel’s First Amendment rights.” Id. at 984. See Brief of Appellants David Boim and 
Kim Boim at 5, Boim v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist, 494 F.3d 978 (11th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-14706-JJ), 
2006 WL 3671902 (confirming the narrative was written at home); William Bird, Constitutional 
Law-True Threat Doctrine and Public School Speech- An Expansive View of A School’s Authority 
to Discipline Allegedly Threatening Student Speech Arising Off Campus, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK 
L. REV. 111, 129 (2003) (analyzing how the court’s decisions pertaining to threatening speech on 
and off campus has changed post-Columbine). 
156. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (holding that because the student did not intend for the speech to come to school, his speech 
is protected); supra note 109 and accompanying text (describing the different types of intent in 
various circuits). 
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threat” analyses could apply to off-campus, online speech if faced with 
the issue.157 
9.  Remaining Circuits 
The First, Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have not yet addressed the 
issue of off-campus student speech.158 For the purposes of this Comment, 
discussion is limited to the cases that reached the federal appellate courts; 
district court opinions regarding similar issues are not included.159 
E.  School Social Media Policies 
School districts enact their own specific policies to regulate students’ 
conduct outside of school in light of the digital age, similar to the 
approaches taken by the federal appellate courts.160 School districts vary 
in the amount of protection and restriction given to social media speech, 
and some do not have written restrictions at all.161 For example, Jordan-
Elbridge Central School District’s social media policy prohibits students 
from writing sensitive, confidential, or disparaging posts on personal 
social media accounts, while Pottsville Area School District expressly 
prohibits any content that could disrupt the school or rights of others.162 
 
157. While this Comment focuses on the holdings of the federal courts of appeals, a ruling from 
the District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Evans v. Bayer is instructive as to how the 
Eleventh Circuit could rule in future off-campus student speech cases. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365. The 
court held that a student could not be punished for creating a social media web page with derogatory 
comments about a teacher, under Tinker, when the speech did not cause any substantial disruption 
and was not accessed on campus. Id. at 1378. 
158. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3369 (discussing each federal appellate court’s review 
of off-campus student speech, but does not include the First, Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits because 
they have not addressed the issue). 
159. Because this Comment is focused on the federal appellate courts, it does not discuss any 
district court rulings on the subject matter. However, in 2013, the District Court for the Eastern 
Division of Tennessee addressed the issue in Nixon v. Hardin County Board of Education. 988 F. 
Supp. 2d 826 (W.D. Tenn. 2013). In Nixon, the student was required to attend an alternative school 
and participate in counseling because she sent threatening tweets directed toward another student. 
Id. at 832. The court held that because the speech was made off-campus, was not directed at the 
school, did not involve any school equipment, and did not cause a substantial disruption, the 
defendants’ summary judgment motion could not succeed. Id. at 839. The court used the sufficient 
nexus precursor to the Tinker test to opine on the issue. See generally Catherine E. Mendola, Big 
Brother as Parent: Using Surveillance to Patrol Students’ Internet Speech, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC. 
JUST. 153, 182 (2015) (discussing the prevalence of social media in student speech cases). 
160. Schools must ensure these policies do not conflict with other policies and meet standards 
imposed by law. See Steven Anderson, How to Create Social Media Guidelines for Your School, 
EDUTOPIA.ORG (2017), https://www.edutopia.org/pdfs/edutopia-anderson-social-media-
guidelines.pdf (providing a step-by-step process schools should abide by when creating social 
media policies). 
161. See infra Part III.B (comparing and contrasting social media policies and the differences 
in restrictions and protections in each policy). 
162. Compare Jordan-Elbridge CSD Social Media Code of Ethics for Students 7310, JORDAN-
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Meanwhile, in its general student handbook, Berkeley County School 
District prohibits off-campus conduct that could foreseeably cause a 
disruption in the school.163 In Part III of this Comment, these school 
policies are analyzed in an effort to provide guidance as to how schools 
can reconcile the differing federal appellate courts’ approaches and create 
policies that protect students’ constitutional rights while still maintaining 
order in the schoolhouse.164 
II.  DISCUSSION 
While the Supreme Court remains silent on the issue of off-campus 
student speech, its rulings on the Internet may be instructive for the 
conflicting federal appellate courts and school districts dealing with 
student speech on social media.165 Two seminal holdings in Reno v. 
ACLU and Packingham v. North Carolina represent the Court’s 
application of the First Amendment to the Internet.166 Section A begins 
by discussing the Court’s holding in Reno, which held that blanket 
provisions regulating the Internet were unconstitutional.167 Next, Section 
B discusses the factual background and the Court’s reasoning in 
Packingham, which established First Amendment protection for social 
media.168 Finally, this Part examines the levels of scrutiny applied to the 
Internet and the differences between content-neutral and content-based 
regulations.169 
 
ELBRIDGE CENT. SCH. DIST. (03/02/2016), 
http://www.jecsd.org/files/filesystem/SocialMediaPolicyStudents.pdf [hereinafter Jordan-
Elbridge Social Media Policy] (listing fourteen restrictions on social media use), with Pottsville 
Area School District: Social Media Policy 816, POTTSVILLE AREA SCH. DIST. (08/17/2011), 
https://www.pottsville.k12.pa.us/cms/lib/PA01916599/Centricity/Domain/38/Social%20Media%
20Policy%20-%20Students.pdf [hereinafter Pottsville Social Media Policy] (limiting any conduct 
which could foreseeably cause a disruption). 
163. See Student Handbook: Student Conduct, BERKELEY COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT (2015), 
https://www.berkeleycountyschools.org/cms/lib02/WV01000962/Centricity/Domain/20/2015-
16%20Generic%20Handbook%20Electronic%20Copy.pdf [hereinafter Berkeley Policy] 
(prohibiting social media postings for the purpose of bullying). 
164. See infra Part III.B (analyzing the positives and negative of three schools’ social media 
policies). 
165. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017) (stating that social media 
is one of the most important places to exchange views); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 
U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“Today, one of the most important places to exchange views is 
cyberspace. . . .”). 
166. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (holding social media is protected speech); Reno, 521 U.S. 
at 870 (finding the Internet to be protected speech). 
167. See infra Part II.A (discussing the factual background, holding, and reasoning in Reno). 
168. See infra Part II.B (discussing the background, reasoning, and majority and concurring 
opinions in Packingham). 
169. See infra Part II.A, B (discussing strict scrutiny as applied to content-based restrictions and 
intermediate scrutiny as applied to content-neutral restrictions). 
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A.  Reno Sets the Stage for Judicial Internet Analysis 
Reno was the first Internet-related case to be resolved in the Supreme 
Court. In Reno, the American Civil Liberties Union brought suit against 
the Attorney General of the United States, arguing that two provisions of 
the Communications Decency Act violated the First Amendment.170 
These provisions sought to protect minors from obscene and sexual 
content on the Internet by prohibiting purposeful transmission of any 
lewd content to a minor.171 The government argued that these provisions 
were narrow enough to further its interest in protecting minors from 
harmful content.172 However, the Court held that the blanket provisions 
were an impermissible infringement on free speech rights.173 The two 
provisions were content-based restrictions because they regulated the 
subject matter and type of speech.174 As such, the Supreme Court applied 
strict scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the provisions.175 
In order to withstand strict scrutiny, a content-based restriction must 
be based on a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest.176 But, because the content-based restriction in 
Reno was overbroad and vague, as the terms “indecent” and “obscene” 
were not defined, the statute did not meet strict scrutiny.177 Further, the 
 
170. Reno, 521 U.S. at 861. 
171. Id. at 858. The first provision, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), “prohibit[s] the knowing transmission 
of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18.” Id. The second provision, 47 U.S.C. § 
223(b), “prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner 
that is available to a person under 18.” Id. 
172. Reno, 521 U.S. at 858; see Brief for Appellants at 12, Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 
521 U.S. 844 (2007) (No. 96-511), 1997 WL 32931, at *12 (arguing the statute is narrowly tailored 
to achieve a compelling government interest). 
173. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868 (noting that the CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on 
speech). See Andrew H. Montroll, Students’ Free Speech Rights in Public Schools: Content-Based 
Versus Public Forum Restrictions, 13 VT. L. REV. 493, 500 (1989) (describing the connection 
between content-based restrictions for adults and content-based restrictions for students and giving 
a general background on content-based restrictions in the court system). 
174. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864. See Blum et al., Tests to be applied to content-based and content-
neutral regulations, 16A AM. JUR. 2D CONST. L. § 480 (2017) (describing the analysis concerning 
content-based restrictions). 
175. Reno, 521 U.S. at 857. Content-based restrictions on speech are typically held 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court illustrated this reasoning in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, writing: 
“[t]he First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even 
expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.” 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citations omitted). 
176. Blum, supra note 174 (discussing the requirements for state-implemented restrictions of 
expression to survive strict scrutiny); Stephen C. Jacques, Comment, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating 
the Internet, the First Amendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1945, 1981–
82 (1997) (“Using this analysis, the Court asked whether the CDA served a compelling government 
interest, and whether it was narrowly tailored to accomplishes [sic] that end using the least 
restrictive means.”). 
177. Reno, 521 U.S. at 860 (holding the statute was unconstitutional because of its over-breadth 
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Court believed the statute would regulate more content than was intended 
and potentially chill Internet expression.178 The Court nonetheless held 
that if the statute was narrowly rewritten to achieve the compelling 
purpose of protecting minors, the Internet was not insulated from 
regulation.179 
The issue the Court addressed in Reno involved the Internet as a whole, 
rather than social media websites specifically.180 But Reno remains 
fundamental in this discussion because the Court emphasized that the 
growing role of the Internet in society “continues to be phenomenal,” 
setting up a line of reasoning that the Court in Packingham relied upon.181 
Because it is one of the only Supreme Court decisions discussing the 
impact of the Internet, Reno is the starting point for scholarly analysis 
relating to restrictions on Internet usage—specifically, how far Reno’s 
protection can stretch.182 
B.  Packingham v. North Carolina: Social Media Has First Amendment 
Protection 
Packingham presented a challenge to a North Carolina statute that 
prohibited sex offenders from accessing social networking websites.183 
In 2002, petitioner Lester Packingham pled guilty to taking indecent 
 
and vagueness). See Jacques, supra note 176, at 1982 (discussing the Court’s reasoning pertaining 
to the vagueness of the statute and noting that “[b]y failing to narrowly tailor the language of the 
statute . . . Congress passed an act that was dangerously vague and clearly unconstitutional under a 
strict scrutiny analysis”). 
178. Reno, 521 U.S. at 871–72 (“The vagueness of such a regulation raises special First 
Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech.”). For more information 
about the chilling effect, see Jennifer M. Kinsley, CHILL, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 268 (2016) 
(discussing the “chilling effect” and the implications resulting from governmental regulations on 
speech); see also Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling 
Effect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978) (describing the fear of the chilling effect in society). 
179. Reno, 521 U.S. at 880. 
180. Id. at 885. Although the decision in Reno did not discuss social media in particular, the 
statement “[t]he record demonstrates that the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be 
phenomenal” foreshadowed a future case, Packingham v. North Carolina. In Packingham, the 
Court alluded to the same premise, additionally upholding another realm of the Internet as protected 
speech. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
181. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (providing a background of the “vast democratic 
forums of the Internet” (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 868)). 
182. Laura Leets, Responses to Internet Hate Sites: Is Speech Too Free in Cyberspace?, 6 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 287, 295 (2001) (discussing Reno’s impact on Internet hate speech). See Alissa 
Ardito, Social Media, Administrative Agencies, and the First Amendment, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 301, 
356 (2013) (discussing Reno’s potential implication in social media cases). 
183. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a) (providing “[i]t 
is unlawful for a sex offender who is registered . . .  to access a commercial social networking Web 
site . . .”). 
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liberties with a child and was required to register as a sex offender.184 In 
2010, a state court dismissed a traffic citation against Packingham.185 In 
response, he posted a message on his Facebook profile, thanking God for 
his good luck.186 However, under N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14–202.5, his 
status as a sex offender barred him from accessing social networking sites 
that he knew minors frequent.187 Packingham was arrested and convicted 
for violating the statute.188 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority and held the statute 
unconstitutional, emphasizing the importance of the Internet to First 
Amendment expression.189 The Court observed that “while in the past 
there may have been difficulties in identifying the most important places 
(in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. 
It is cyberspace . . . and social media in particular.”190 Providing further 
insight into the role social media plays in society, the Court noted that 
seven in ten American adults use at least one social media website and 
that Facebook’s membership of 1.79 billion users is three times the size 
of North America.191 Justice Kennedy described the positive impact 
 
184. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. See State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738, 743–44 (N.C. 
2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (providing a procedural history and in-depth factual 
background in the North Carolina Supreme Court decision). 
185. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734; Brief for Petitioner at 4, Packingham v. North Carolina, 
137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (No. 15–1194), 2016 WL 7321777, at *4 [hereinafter Packingham Brief for 
Petitioner]. 
186. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. The statement said: “Man God is Good! How about I got 
so much favor they dismissed the ticket before court even started? No fine, no court cost, no nothing 
spent. Praise be to GOD, WOW! Thank JESUS!” See Packingham Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
185, at 4 (discussing the petitioner’s intent behind the Facebook post was to express his content 
and his permitted First Amendment rights). 
187. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. The statute provides that it is: 
[U]nlawful for a sex offender who is registered in accordance with Article 27A of 
Chapter 14 of the General Statutes to access a commercial social networking Web site 
where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to become members 
or to create or maintain personal Web pages on the commercial social networking Web 
site. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a). Violation of the statute is a Class I felony. Id. at § 14-
202.5(e). 
188. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. Packingham argued that the law violated his First 
Amendment rights, but he was convicted at trial. However, his conviction was reversed in the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals. The North Carolina Supreme Court reinstated the ruling of the trial 
court, finding that the state had sufficient interest in “forestall[ing] the illicit lurking and contact” 
of registered sex offenders and their victims.” Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 746. See State v. 
Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (vacating the opinion of the trial court). 
189. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735. 
190. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
191. Id. See, e.g., Social Media Statistics for June 2017, NAT. ARCHIVES (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.archives.gov/files/social-media/reports/social-media-stats-fy-2017-06.pdf (providing 
a detailed review of social media statistics as of June 2017); Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW 
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websites like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter have on the expression of 
diverse ideas and protected First Amendment activity.192 Specifically, the 
Court noted the important role social media plays in expressing religious 
beliefs, debating politics, engaging in the democratic process by 
petitioning elected officials, and advancing careers.193 
The Court additionally warned that it must exercise extreme caution 
before ruling, or even suggesting, that the First Amendment does not 
provide protection for social media because the forces of the Internet are 
new and constantly changing.194 Justice Kennedy likened the Internet to 
a public park; but, since speech from the Internet has the ability to reach 
people worldwide, the Internet has now surpassed the public park to 
become the most important channel for expression.195 However, the 
Court recognized that First Amendment protection cannot apply to all 
circumstances, and there are certainly instances in which speech can be 
curtailed.196 In this instance, though, because this content-neutral 
regulation of speech burdened significantly more speech than necessary 
to advance the government’s important interest in protecting vulnerable 
victims from dangerous predators, North Carolina did not meet its 
burden.197 
North Carolina argued, and the Court agreed, that the statute was 
content-neutral because it prohibited access to websites without regard to 
the content of viewpoints expressed.198 Unlike the content-based statute 
 
RESEARCH CTR., (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ (providing 
statistics on social media use in 2016). 
192. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (citing Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 
870 (1997) (internal quotations omitted)). See Marco della Cava, How Facebook Changed our 
Lives, USA TODAY (Feb. 2, 2014, 10:19 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/02/02/facebook-turns-10-cultural-impact/5063979/ 
(discussing the impact of Facebook and the business model of the social media giant). 
193. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735–36 (discussing the impact social media platforms have on 
citizens’ lives, stating: “[i]n short, social media users employ these websites to engage in a wide 
array of protected First Amendment activity on topics ‘as diverse as human thought’” (quoting 
Reno, 521 U.S. at 870)). See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 15–16, Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (No. 15–
1194), 2016 WL 7449172 [hereinafter Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation] (providing 
statistics of how many people use social media platforms for a wide variety of protected activities). 
194. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736. 
195. Id. at 1737 (“These websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available 
to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard. They allow a person with an Internet connection 
to ‘become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.’” 
(quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870)). 
196. Id. See Blake A. Klinker, Yes, You Do Have a First Amendment Right to Social Media, 
WYO. LAW., Aug. 1, 2017, at 54 (expressing that the Court left open the possibility of crafting a 
narrow law that would withstand intermediate scrutiny). 
197. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738. 
198. Id. See Brief for Respondent at 40, Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) 
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in Reno, a content-neutral regulation controls the circumstances under 
which speech may take place, also known as time, place, and manner 
restrictions.199 Content-neutral regulations are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny, which triggers analysis of whether the challenged statute 
advances an important government interest by means that are 
substantially related to achieving that interest.200 The Court disagreed 
that the statute could withstand intermediate scrutiny because, while 
protecting children is certainly an important interest, the means were not 
substantially related to achieving that interest because the statute 
burdened significantly more speech than necessary.201 But, the Court 
made it clear that a state could accomplish this goal by enacting a more 
narrowly written statute.202 Thus, under Packingham, a government 
entity may only regulate the Internet, or social media, when the regulation 
is specific enough to curtail only the speech that is necessary to further 
an important government interest.203 
Justice Alito, in a concurring opinion, agreed the content-neutral 
statute could not withstand intermediate scrutiny because it forbid access 
to websites unlikely to facilitate the government’s important interest.204 
However, Justice Alito argued the majority erred in equating the Internet 
with a public forum, expressing concern that the Court’s loose rhetoric 
could prevent states from regulating the Internet altogether.205 
 
(No. 15–1194), 2017 WL 345120 (“Second-guessing the North Carolina Legislature’s judgment, 
petitioner claims that Section 202.5 is broader than necessary, and that less speech-restrictive 
measures could as effectively achieve the State’s objective of protecting children from sexual 
predators. Neither contention is correct.”). 
199. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1739 (Alito, J., concurring). See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW 
OF LAWYER ADVERTISING § 2:9 (2017) (discussing content-neutral regulations analyses); Martin 
Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 128 (1981) 
(analyzing the approaches to content-neutral and content-based restrictions on speech). 
200. See Montroll, supra note 173, at 500 (discussing the content-neutral regulations and the 
type of analysis rendered when presented in court). 
201. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738. 
202. Id. at 1737; Klinker, supra note 196, at 55 (“Thus, it appears that Packingham presents an 
invitation for legislatures to go back to the drawing board to craft laws which more ‘specifically’ 
target internet-based harms.”). 
203. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. See infra Part III (discussing public school policies that 
would probably not survive under Packingham scrutiny). 
204. In his concurring opinion for Packingham, Justice Alito wrote: 
I am troubled by the Court’s loose rhetoric. After noting that “a street or a park is a 
quintessential forum for the exercise of First Amendment rights,” the Court states that 
“cyberspace” and “social media in particular” are now the “most important places (in a 
spatial sense) for the exchange of views.” 
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring). 
205. Id. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion did not go unnoticed, as David Post of The 
Washington Post opined that the concurring justices: 
[A]greed with the majority that the NC statute “sweeps far too broadly to satisfy the 
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Addressing the majority’s contention that courts need to be careful before 
handing down opinions or fashioning rules regarding the Internet, Alito 
reasoned that the Court explicitly did what it warned of.206 Thus, Alito 
disagreed with the majority’s heightened protection of the Internet and 
advocated for the enactment of narrower statutes in order to further 
significant interests without burdening more speech than necessary.207 
Justice Kennedy highlighted an important issue when he wrote that 
courts must be careful before reaching an opinion regarding the Internet 
because “what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.”208 It takes 
years before the Supreme Court hears a case, as the United States legal 
system can be slow and the appellate process is meticulous.209 Therefore, 
instead of approaching the complicated issue of off-campus, online 
student speech by waiting for the Court to provide guidance, schools 
should take matters into their own hands.210 Schools should draft social 
media policies themselves, implementing some of the tests set forth in the 
federal appellate courts’ decisions, as well as the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Packingham, in order to create clear policies that instruct 
students on exactly what conduct on social media will be subject to 
punishment.211 However, in order to properly craft an ideal policy, it is 
first necessary to analyze the approaches taken by the federal appellate 
 
demands of the Free Speech Clause,” and they had no particular problem with the way 
the majority characterized and undertook the First Amendment analysis in the case. 
Rather unusually, I think, their disagreement focused entirely on nuance, 
characterization and rhetoric . . . 
David Post, Supreme Court Unanimously Overturns North Carolina’s Ban on Social-Media Use 
by Sex Offenders, WASH. POST (July 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/07/03/supreme-court-unanimously-overturns-north-carolinas-ban-on-social-
media-use-by-sex-offenders/?utm_term=.6a428fedab89. 
206. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1744 (Alito, J., concurring) (“It is regrettable that the Court had 
not heeded its own admonition of caution.”). 
207. Id.; Klinker, supra note 196, at 55 (summarizing Justice Alito’s concurring opinion). 
208. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736. Justice Kennedy emphasized many of the statistics from 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Amicus Curiae Brief in the text of his opinion. See Brief for 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 193 (expressing that seven in ten American adults use 
at least one Internet networking service). 
209. Charles B. Elliott, The Legislatures and the Courts: The Power to Declare Statutes 
Unconstitutional, 4 POL. SCI. Q. 224, 249 (1890) (discussing the slow process from the trial court 
to the Supreme Court and arguing the legislature is better equipped to handle changing societal 
interests); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Politicians in Robes: The Separation of Powers and the 
Problem of Judicial Legislation, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 31, 39 (2015), 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/politicians-robes-separation-powers-and-
problem-judicial-legislation (arguing that judges are not equipped to decide political questions left 
for the legislature, describing the process as slow). 
210. See infra Part IV (arguing for schools to approach this issue by enacting policies 
themselves, instead of allowing courts to dictate what speech is protected). 
211. See infra Part IV (proposing a model policy for school districts to implement to balance 
their interests and students’ First Amendment rights). 
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courts and some current school policies. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The federal appellate courts’ inconsistent approach to off-campus 
student speech has resulted in an unpredictable application of the First 
Amendment and uncertainty as to when off-campus student speech is 
protected or within the realm of a school’s disciplinary authority.212 In 
Tinker, the Court established students’ First Amendment rights in 
schools, but subsequent decisions afforded school administrators greater 
authority to punish student speech.213 
The Supreme Court has yet to hold that any particular test applies to 
off-campus speech, yet the federal appellate courts have taken it upon 
themselves to apply Supreme Court precedent, particularly Tinker, to off-
campus, online speech.214 While not directly addressing the issue of off-
campus speech, the Court in Packingham established that social media 
deserves First Amendment protection; thus, restrictions on social media 
deserve heightened scrutiny.215 As such, courts need to keep 
Packingham’s reasoning in mind while ruling on off-campus, online 
speech cases.216 
This Part begins by analyzing and critiquing the threshold tests used 
by the federal appellate courts and the impact these tests have on student 
speech.217 Next, this Part looks at schools’ social media policies and 
evaluates whether these restrictions on the Internet would be upheld 
under the test the Court articulated in Packingham.218 Finally, this Part 
addresses the “chilling effect” that results from overbroad restrictions on 
 
212. Levin, supra note 25, at 869–70 (criticizing the circuit split and arguing for a uniform 
approach because “the lower courts’ decisions lack any sense of uniformity”). 
213. See supra Part I.A (discussing the Tinker approach); supra Part I.B (discussing the tests 
articulated in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse as further restrictions on student speech inside the 
schoolhouse). 
214. See Jessica K. Boyd, Moving the Bully from the Schoolyard to Cyberspace: How Much 
Protection Is Off-Campus Student Speech Awarded Under the First Amendment?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 
1215, 1235 (2013) (“The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits all applied Tinker in cases where 
students were punished for off-campus Internet speech, barely pausing to consider whether the 
Supreme Court intended Tinker to be applicable to students when they left school grounds.”); 
Courtney M. Willard, Decoding Student Speech Rights: Clarification and Application of Supreme 
Court Principles to Online Student Speech Cases, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 293, 312 (2013) 
(tracing the history of student speech cases, from the armbands in Tinker to the blog post in 
Wisniewski). 
215. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the factual 
background, holding, reasoning, and scrutiny applied in Packingham. 
216. See infra Part IV (proposing a framework for schools to adhere to while crafting social 
media policies that fit within the reasoning of Packingham). 
217. See infra Part III.A (analyzing the five threshold tests used by the federal appellate courts). 
218. See infra Part III.B (discussing the policies incorporated by individual public schools). 
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student speech.219 
A.  The Implications of the Circuits’ Inconsistent Threshold Tests 
Most circuits apply a Tinker analysis to off-campus speech cases, but 
some circuits tweak the test to focus on different factors that either allow 
or prohibit the regulation of speech.220 While the problem lies in the 
Supreme Court’s lack of precedent on the issue, it also lies within school 
policies pertaining to social media.221 This Section is limited to 
discussing the various approaches to social media speech and analyzing 
what types of speech are inside the scope of schools’ authority to 
discipline.222 Further, the analysis will examine the constitutionality of 
these tests in light of the holding in Packingham.223 
1.  Reasonable Foreseeability Threshold to Tinker 
The Second, Seventh, and Eighth circuits adopt the reasonable 
foreseeability threshold to the Tinker test to analyze off-campus 
speech.224 The courts first consider whether it was reasonably foreseeable 
that the off-campus speech would reach the schoolhouse.225 If so, then 
courts ask whether such off-campus speech would cause a substantial and 
 
219. See infra Part III.C (discussing the “chilling effect” stemming from regulations on student 
speech). 
220. See Calve, supra note 82, at 386 (noting that “[c]ircuit courts have continuously invoked 
Tinker to regulate off-campus cyberspeech, particularly when the speech is violent or threatening, 
but the method of application is inconsistent across the country”); Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 
3420 (discussing the split among federal courts of appeals regarding whether Tinker extends to off-
campus speech). 
221. See Calve, supra note 82, at 400–01 (“Clashing decisions by lower courts about the 
applicability of the Tinker substantial disruption test to off-campus student speech . . . amplified 
the necessity for the Court’s guidance.”); Aaron J. Hersh, Rehabilitating Tinker: A Modest 
Proposal to Protect Public-School Students’ First Amendment Free Expression Rights in the 
Digital Age, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1309, 1321 (2007) (arguing that Tinker had been degraded over time 
by subsequent decisions such as Fraser and Morse). 
222. This Comment will not focus on off-campus speech that is written on tangible property, 
spoken speech, or any speech that does not exist on a social networking website. For a discussion 
of speech and the judicial analysis used for off-campus speech that does not occur online, see Porter 
v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding the punishment of a student 
for a violent drawing produced off-campus was unconstitutional). 
223. See infra Part III.A (analyzing the threshold tests used by the federal appellate courts under 
Packingham). 
224. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3420 (discussing the reasonable foreseeability test 
applied by the Second Circuit). See, e.g., S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist, 696 
F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012) (using the reasonably foreseeable test); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 
48 (2d Cir. 2008) (using the reasonable foreseeability threshold); Scoville v. Bd. of Educ. of Joilet 
Twp. High Sch. Dist. 204, Cty. of Will., State of Ill., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970) (applying the 
“reasonable foreseeability” test to off-campus speech, but not online off-campus speech). 
225. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 348 (articulating the “reasonable foreseeability” test). 
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material disruption.226 This two-part test seems reasonable, but has its 
flaws.227 
First, the test is overly broad, akin to the speech-restrictive statute in 
Packingham which the Court found unconstitutional.228 The breadth of 
this test is illustrated in Doninger v. Niehoff.229 In Doninger, a student 
was disciplined for writing a blog post casting administrators in a bad 
light and encouraging peers to harass them.230 The Second Circuit 
reasoned that the post was a foreseeable disruption to the school due to 
the language used, the incorporation of false information, and the fact that 
the post directly pertained to a school event.231 While the outcome may 
have been correct in this limited instance, the test articulated in Doninger 
fails to define the content that is within its intended scope.232 Consider a 
hypothetical situation in which a student writes a blog post defending a 
controversial immigration ban and encouraging others to speak out in the 
same way.233 If it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech would cause 
a material and substantial disruption in class, the school could lawfully 
take disciplinary action.234 Political speech has consistently been 
 
226. Id. For a in-depth discussion of what it might take to make speech “reasonably foreseeable” 
to reach the schoolhouse, see Ronna Greff Schneider, General Restrictions on Freedom of Speech 
in Schools, 1 EDUCATION LAW § 2:3 (2016) (analyzing the Tinker opinion and providing in-depth 
information on the ‘substantial and material disruption’ standard); Levin, supra note 25, at 870 
(making an argument as to what makes it reasonably foreseeable to administrators that online 
speech will reach the schoolhouse, but stating that the standard is subjective). 
227. Nathan S. Fronk, Doninger v. Niehoff: An Example of Public Schools’ Paternalism and 
the Off-Campus Restriction of Students’ First Amendment Rights, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1417, 
1438 (2009) (arguing the test used in Doninger is too broad and will be problematic for students 
going forward). 
228. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017). See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. 
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding “[a] bare 
foreseeability standard could be stretched too far, and would risk ensnaring any off-campus 
expression”); Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3430–31 (criticizing the reasonable foreseeability 
threshold test). 
229. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 348. 
230. Id. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing Doninger). See also supra note 101 and accompanying 
text (discussing the speech at issue in Doninger). 
231. For an in-depth review of the Court’s reasoning and the competing arguments, see Hayes, 
supra note 102, at 260; Travis Miller, Doninger v. Niehoff: Taking Tinker Too Far, 5 LIBERTY U. 
L. REV. 303, 324 (2011) (arguing that the Second Circuit has a misguided approach to applying 
what Tinker was intended to portray, and “[s]uch an exercise of Tinker’s substantial disruption test 
was never considered by the Court”). 
232. See Fronk, supra note 227, at 1420 (arguing “the court did not define how or when its 
[substantial disruption] test would be met”); Miller, supra note 231, at 324 (“This test, as Doninger 
clearly noted, allows a school to suppress speech that it reasonably predicts will cause disruption.”). 
233. In Snyder, Judge Smith hypothesized a scenario in which a student could be punished for 
writing a controversial blog post on gay marriage, similar to the hypothetical posed herein. Snyder, 
650 F.3d at 924. 
234. Id. For further discussion on what constitutes a “substantial and material” disruption, see 
Kristi L. Bowman, Symposium: The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. 
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protected, but the breadth of this specific test could become a vehicle to 
suppress this type of conduct.235 
As the Court held in Packingham, statutes or policies enacted by a 
governmental entity must be narrowly written to survive heightened 
scrutiny.236 The North Carolina statute that was held unconstitutional in 
Packingham was too broad because it restricted access to websites, and 
thus speech, that was unrelated to the statute’s stated interest of protecting 
minors from sexual predators.237 Similar to the statute in Packingham, 
the reasonable foreseeability threshold does not define the type of speech 
that one could reasonably foresee causing a substantial disruption.238 In 
this regard, the test serves to limit more speech than necessary to protect 
the interests of the schools.239 
Second, the test affords school administrators too much discretion.240 
 
REV. 1129 (2009); Levin, supra note 25, at 861 (defining “substantial disruption” as it was intended 
in Tinker and the distorted definition school administrators use today). 
235. See 147 CONG. REC. S.3233, 3235 (daily ed. June 19, 2001): 
In the 21st Century, it’s easy to forget that America’s Founding Fathers sacrificed all to 
give Americans political freedom. These patriots fought and risked their lives and 
everything they had to secure and protect free political speech, dissent or assent, of all 
kinds. Free political speech protects us from tyranny. 
For a discussion on the history of political speech in the United States, see FLOYD ABRAMS, THE 
SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: WHY FREEDOM OF SPEECH MATTERS 25 (2017); Second Circuit 
Holds That Qualified Immunity Shields School Officials Who Discipline Students for Their Online 
Speech — Doninger v. Niehoff, 125 HARV. L. REV. 811, 817 (2008) (critiquing the broad test the 
court promulgated in Doninger, and opining that the court “in effect suggested that student speech 
is not protected when it causes or perpetuates a controversy at school or when it disrupts student 
government”). See also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The 
opinion of the Court does not endorse the broad argument advanced by petitioners and the United 
States that the First Amendment permits public school officials to censor any student speech that 
interferes with a school’s ‘educational mission.’”). 
236. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (holding “[i]n order to survive 
intermediate scrutiny, a law must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest’” (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014))). 
237. See supra, Part II.C (discussing Packingham). See also Post, supra note 205 (“This statute 
— like many of the laws concerning what sex offenders may and may not do — was preposterously 
overly broad from the get-go, and the only question in my mind was whether any justices could 
possibly fail to see that.”) (emphasis in original). 
238. See Miller, supra note 231, at 321–23 (criticizing the test the court laid out in Doninger, 
arguing that the “reasonable foreseeability” threshold is inconsistent with Tinker and “Doninger 
took a misguided approach regarding when the Tinker test should govern”). See also Burch v. 
Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that the Second Circuit’s approach, and thus 
the reasonable foreseeability threshold, was “in fundamental conflict with the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Tinker”). 
239. Compare Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (using the reasonable 
foreseeability threshold and upholding the punishment for an off-campus blog post), with Layshock 
ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (using the intent 
threshold to vacate the punishment for an off-campus blog post). 
240. R. Chace Ramey, The School Official’s Ability to Limit Student First Amendment 
Freedom: Exploring the boundaries of Student Speech and Expression in School as Defined by the 
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Whether it is reasonably foreseeable that speech will reach school 
property is certainly subjective, and what is foreseeable to one 
administrator may not be foreseeable to another.241 The Eighth Circuit 
illustrated this flaw in Wilson.242 The school administrators in Wilson 
suspended two students for creating a website containing racist and 
sexually explicit posts about other students at the high school.243 The 
students used a foreign domain website, which prevented people in the 
United States from finding the website through a typical search.244 But, 
if a person knew the specific domain address, any user could find the 
website.245 The court indicated that only a few students knew about the 
website.246 Nonetheless, the administrators argued, and the court agreed, 
it was reasonably foreseeable that this speech would reach the school, 
despite the privacy precautions inherent in the post.247 Thus, the court 
implied that it is reasonably foreseeable that any online speech pertaining 
to a student, teacher, or anything in relation to the school will reach school 
grounds.248 This allows administrators broad discretion to characterize 
 
United States Federal Courts (Spring 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Iowa University) (on file 
with the Iowa University Library system); Jonathan Turley, Second Circuit Upholds Punishment 
of High School Student for Out-of-School Web Entry, JONATHANTURLEY.ORG (May 30, 2008), 
https://jonathanturley.org/2008/05/30/second-circuit-upholds-punishment-of-high-school-student-
for-out-of-school-web-entry/ (“The continual expansion of the authority of school officials over 
student speech teaches a foul lesson to these future citizens. I would prefer some obnoxious speech 
than teaching students that they must please government officials if they want special benefits . . .”). 
241. Brief of Appellees at 53, S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 
771 (8th Cir. 2012) (No. 12–1727), 2012 WL 2884128 (“[T]he school’s strong authority over 
student speech extends no further than the schoolhouse gates. Otherwise, simple enrollment in a 
public school would operate as a partial forfeiture of otherwise inviolable First Amendment rights. 
This is not, and cannot be, the law.”). See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 
915, 926 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding “[t]hose officials involved in the educational process 
perform ‘important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions’ . . .” but that “[t]he authority of 
public school officials is not boundless”). 
242. See generally S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
243. Id. at 771, 774. 
244. Id. at 774. For an explanation of a “foreign domain” website, see Todd Stone, What You 
Didn’t Know About .LY, .TV, .SY and Other Foreign Domain Names, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 21, 
2011, 12:48 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-you-didnt-know-about-ly-tv-sy-and-
other-foreign-domain-names-2011-7. 
245. Wilson, 696 F.3d at 774 (“[A]ny U.S. user could access NorthPress if she knew the website 
address. The site was not password protected.”); Stone, supra note 244 (discussing the significance 
of registering a website under a foreign domain name). 
246. Wilson, 696 F.3d at 775. 
247. Id. at 778; Brief of Appellees at 12, S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 
supra note 241 (noting that the website was not password protected and, as such, it was accessible 
to anyone). 
248. J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(holding that in the absence of evidence that conduct would result in a substantial disruption, a 
school official cannot characterize speech as “reasonably foreseeable” to reach school grounds 
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any speech they find offensive as reasonably foreseeable to reach school 
grounds.249 Furthermore, the broad discretion afforded to school 
administrators potentially limits students’ conduct on all social media 
platforms as well as the Internet in general, creating an impermissibly 
broad limitation like the statute that was held unconstitutional in 
Packingham.250 
Finally, because any online speech may inevitably make its way to 
school grounds due to the expansive reach of the Internet, the test fails to 
afford sufficient protection for online speech.251 Because so many teens 
report going online daily, all writings on social media may foreseeably 
make their way onto school grounds.252 This subjects speech that is 
spoken or written on paper to a higher degree of protection than speech 
that is written online due to the pervasive nature of the Internet.253 Justice 
Kennedy alluded to this premise in Packingham when he cautioned courts 
 
merely because the speech is offensive); Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3430 (discussing the 
potentially broad scope of the Doninger test). 
249. Hayes, supra note 102, at 279 (“Giving administrators this sort of unfettered discretion 
could potentially chill all juvenile speech.”). See Darin M. Williams, Tinker Operationalized: The 
Judiciary’s Practical Answer to Student Cyberspeech, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 125, 152 (2012) 
(arguing that “[u]nder the operationalized Tinker standard expounded above, schools clearly have 
broad authority” and “[t]his leads to concern that schools have used, and will continue to use, this 
wide deference to unconstitutionally infringe upon the First Amendment rights of students”). 
250. Miller, supra note 231, at 305 (arguing that “[b]y clinging to Tinker, the Second 
Circuit . . . stretched a school’s authority under Tinker”). See Abby Marie Mollen, In Defense of 
the “Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial Student Speech, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1510 (2008) 
(stating that the federal appellate courts have “treated school officials as the protagonists and 
focused on facilitating their ‘comprehensive authority . . . to prescribe and control conduct in the 
schools’ . . . an authority that Tinker recognized but limited”). 
251. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (noting that “social media 
users employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activit[ies]”). 
See TED, Andrew Blum: What is the Internet, really?, YOUTUBE (Sept. 19, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XE_FPEFpHt4 (discussing how quickly the Internet reaches 
across the world and the technology required to post a thought on social media). See generally 
Gwenn Schurgin O’Keeffe et al., The Impact of Social Media on Children, Adolescents, and 
Families, 127 AMER. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS 800 (Apr. 2011), 
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/127/4/800.full.pdf. 
252. Lehnhart, supra note 3 (discussing the widespread use of social media by students); Phillip 
Lee, Expanding the Schoolhouse Gate: Public Schools (K-12) and the Regulation of Cyberbullying, 
2016 UTAH L. REV. 831, 845 (“[S]ocial media facilitates mass participation in collective dialogues 
in virtual communities of interest.”). 
253. See Sally A. Specht, The Wavering, Unpredictable Line Between “Speech” and Conduct: 
The Expressive Conduct After Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 
1990), 40 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 173, 187 (1991) (using the factual background in 
Young v. New York City Transit Authority as an analogy to categorize spoken speech that is 
suggestive, but protected, verses speech that is written and unprotected); Kathryn S. Vander Broek, 
Schools and Social Media: First Amendment Issues Arising From Student Use of the Internet, 21 
No. 4 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 11, 31 (2009) (discussing how frequently teachers create 
assignments based on at-home social media posting and how difficult it is to regulate content that 
will be seen by teachers and faculty). 
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from fashioning tests pertaining to the Internet due to its vast dimensions 
and ability to reach an unlimited number of people.254 
2.  Sufficient Nexus Threshold to Tinker 
The sufficient nexus threshold adopted by the Fourth Circuit in 
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools has not been adopted by any other 
circuit.255 In Kowalski, the court held that the school was justified in 
suspending a student who created a social media account for the purpose 
of ridiculing another student.256 Under the test used by the Fourth Circuit 
in Kowalski, a school can discipline a student for off-campus speech that 
has a sufficient nexus to the school’s pedagogical interests.257 This test 
was first articulated in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, but the 
speech in Kuhlmeier was a school-sponsored newspaper, rather than a 
social media post from a personal account.258 Moreover, it is uncertain 
whether the Court in Kuhlmeier could have anticipated its threshold 
would apply to off-campus speech, particularly speech posted online.259 
The sufficient nexus threshold is overly broad and fails to define what 
interests will warrant discipline for off-campus, online speech.260 
 
254. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017); Clay Calvert, Punishing 
Public School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers & Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech 
Issue the Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 235–36 (2010) 
(expressing “three reasons why it is reasonably foreseeable that nearly any and all controversial or 
provocative speech that is created and posted [online,] off-campus by a student will come to the 
attention of school authorities:” (1) tattletale students; (2) curious teachers/administrators; and (3) 
in-school buzz/discussion). See Alana Nunez-Garcia, How Much Does Social Media Affect High 
School Students?, L.A. TIMES (June 17, 2016), http://highschool.latimes.com/saint-joseph-high-
school/how-much-does-social-media-affect-high-school-students/ (explaining how quickly content 
on social media travels through students). 
255. See Rothman, supra note 73, at 294 (discussing the different approaches the circuits take 
when analyzing student speech). Compare Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (using a sufficient nexus threshold with the Tinker test), with Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 
F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008) (using the reasonably foreseeable and Tinker tests for off-campus 
speech), and J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 928 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (using the reasonably foreseeable and Tinker approaches, with an emphasis on intent). 
256. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 568. 
257. Id. at 573. See generally supra Part I.D.3 (discussing the sufficient nexus test as articulated 
by the Fourth Circuit). 
258. Compare Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988) (restricting 
students’ distribution of a school newspaper), with Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 577 (restricting students’ 
online speech). 
259. Brief of Appellant at 22, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Pub. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 
2011) (No. 10–1098), 2010 WL 2380373, at *22 (“[I]n Justice White’s majority opinion [in 
Kuhlmeier], the Court recognized that, although the school could censor speech, ‘it could not censor 
similar speech outside the school.’”). See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 529 (discussing 
the limits to the reach of the Supreme Court’s student speech cases). 
260. Kevin Nathaniel Troy Fowler, Tinker Tortured: The Scope of Student Off-Campus Viral 
Speech Rights in the Federal Circuits, 104 KY. L.J. 719, 739 (2015) (arguing that “‘pedagogical 
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Although its breadth is not as wide as the reasonable foreseeability 
approach, schools can justify punishment by setting forth any interest that 
promotes the education of students and protects their health and safety.261 
The interests articulated in Kowalski were student health and safety 
against cyberbullying, but school administrators may choose any interest 
that fits the circumstances of the speech.262 For example, if a student 
wrote a post on his Facebook profile chastising gay marriage, the 
administration could cite the interest of institutional diversity and may 
have authority to punish this speech.263 
As a school could potentially pick any important interest to justify 
regulating off-campus conduct, the articulation of this threshold test may 
be overbroad and afford schools too much authority.264 While schools do 
have an interest in maintaining efficiency and safety, in order to survive 
Packingham scrutiny, the interest must be significant.265 In contrast, 
under the sufficient nexus approach, the school administrators could 
choose any interest, so long as it is implicated by the speech.266 
Therefore, schools can use the sufficient nexus test to justify discipline 
 
interests’ is an extremely vague term that the Court did not spend sufficient time describing”); 
Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3431 (arguing this approach is unclear and thus should not be used 
to analyze off-campus speech). 
261. Compare Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572 (describing the interest the school had in preventing 
bullying), with Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (writing 
“deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important – indeed, perhaps compelling’ interest”), 
and Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986) (stating the school had a 
legitimate interest in protecting schoolchildren from lewd and indecent language). 
262. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572. See Calvert, supra note 254, at 251 (describing the number of 
interests a school district has in ensuring efficiency). 
263. See, e.g., Philip Tegeler, The ‘Compelling Government Interest’ in School Diversity: 
Rebuilding the Case for an Affirmative Government Role, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1021, 1023 
(2014) (describing the interests schools have in diverse environments: “[p]roviding students with 
diverse, inclusive educational opportunities from an early age is crucial to achieving the nation’s 
educational and civic goals . . .” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY AND AVOID RACIAL 
ISOLATION IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1 (2011))). 
264. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3431 (asking “would a school’s interest in shielding its 
faculty be sufficient? . . . Or a school’s interest in preserving institutional integrity?”); Kevin P. 
Brady, Student-Created Fake Online Profiles Using Social Networking Websites: Protected Online 
Speech Parodies or Defamation?, 244 WEST EDUC. L. REP. 907, 908 (2009) (noting that “lower 
courts are faced with unclear and often contradictory legal guidelines of how far a school’s legal 
authority extends when regulating student cyberspeech”). 
265. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). See supra Part II.C 
(discussing the level of scrutiny applied in Packingham). In order for a regulation subject to 
intermediate scrutiny to be constitutional, it must further an important government interest by 
means that are substantially related to that interest. See also Redish, supra note 199, at 128 
(describing intermediate scrutiny). 
266. See Tegeler, supra note 263, at 1023 (providing examples of important interests schools 
can have). 
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that would not survive Packingham scrutiny. As such, this test is overly 
broad.267 
In addition, the sufficient nexus test leaves open the question of what 
makes the nexus between off-campus speech and a school’s pedagogical 
interests sufficiently strong.268 The sufficient nexus standard may apply 
when the speech is directed toward a student, administrator, or event;269 
or, when the speech pertains to potential violence.270 But, the court did 
not provide specific guidance to determine when this standard would 
apply, resulting in possible inconsistent application of the test to different 
situations.271 This inconsistent application will likely restrict students’ 
right to free expression because of the many interests schools could 
articulate to justify punishment.272 Further, under Packingham, the Court 
made it clear that in order to survive heightened scrutiny, the statute, or 
in this case, the threshold test, must be narrowly tailored.273 Stating that 
a school administrator needs a sufficient nexus between the speech and 
the school’s interests does not define the types of conduct for which 
discipline could be justified. Therefore, the test is not narrowly 
tailored.274 
 
267. Id. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3431 (noting “[t]he Kowalski court, however, 
declined to offer guidance on the types of pedagogical interests that would permit jurisdiction”). 
268. See Stephanie Klupinski, Getting Past the Schoolhouse Gate: Rethinking Student Speech 
in the Digital Age, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 626 (2010) (describing the inconsistency of the sufficient 
nexus test as applied). 
269. See, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding the 
student’s speech was impermissible because it was “aimed at a fellow student” and “created ‘actual 
or nascent’ substantial disorder and disruption in the school”) (citations omitted); Doninger v. 
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding a student’s speech was subject to discipline 
because it was targeted at the school principal). 
270. See, e.g., Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(holding violent speech is impermissible because a school has an interest in protecting students); 
Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding student 
speech that embraced violence was not protected due to a school’s interest in preventing attacks). 
271. Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3431. For an in-depth critique of the “sufficient nexus” 
threshold test, see Tiffany Emrick, When Myspace Crosses the School Gates: The Implications of 
Cyberspeech on Students’ Free Speech Rights, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 785, 806–10 (2009). 
272. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (stating “we need not fully define that limit here, as we are 
satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech to [the school’s interest] was sufficiently strong . . . ”); 
Harriet A. Hoder, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public School Jurisprudence, 
50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 1585 (2009) (writing “the court still decided to use the less definite ‘sufficient 
nexus’ test, presumably to allow for flexibility in applying the student speech jurisprudence, 
depending on the facts of the case”). 
273. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
274. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (stating that the school needs a sufficient nexus between the 
speech and the school, but not defining what is within the scope of the nexus); SMOLLA, supra note 
199 (defining intermediate scrutiny). 
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3.  Intent Precursor to the Reasonable Foreseeability Threshold 
While the Third Circuit specifically adopts the reasonable 
foreseeability threshold to the Tinker test in off-campus speech cases, the 
court is unique in its application.275 In assessing whether it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the speech will reach school grounds and cause a 
substantial disruption, the court looks at whether the student intended the 
speech to make its way onto school grounds and if the student intended 
the content of the speech to be taken seriously.276 In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. 
Blue Mountain School District, the court held that because the student did 
not intend for his social media account that ridiculed the school’s 
principal to reach the school, it could not be reasonably foreseeable that 
this speech could cause a substantial disruption.277 In Layshock v. 
Hermitage School District, the court held the same under nearly identical 
facts.278 The intent requirement for determining whether discipline can 
be upheld under Tinker may be difficult in application, but it is a step in 
the right direction in protecting students’ First Amendment rights.279 
To satisfy the intent requirement, the test requires an express showing 
that the student meant for his or her speech to reach the school.280 A 
student will likely not admit that he or she intended this speech to reach 
 
275. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (adopting the reasonably foreseeable approach focusing on the student’s intent to determine 
if the speech is subject to First Amendment protection); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (applying the same test articulated in Snyder). 
276. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 930 (holding the student did not intend to cause a material 
disruption because “the profile was so outrageous that no one could have taken it seriously, and no 
one did”). See also Rashmi Joshi, Sharing the Digital Sandbox: The Effects of Ubiquitous 
Computing on Student Speech and Cyberbullying Jurisprudence, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 629, 
657 (2013) (noting “intentional distribution of speech occurs when the student . . . knows to a 
substantial certainty that the student’s actions will cause the speech to be distributed inside the 
schoolhouse gates”) (quoting Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students’ Rights: The Need 
for an Enhanced First Amendment Standard to Protect Off-Campus Student Internet Speech, 36 
CAP. U. L. REV. 129, 150 (2007)). 
277. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 918. 
278. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 208. For a comparison between Snyder and Layshock, see Fern L. 
Kletter, Annotation, School’s Violation of Parents’ Substantive Due Process Rights Due to Their 
Child’s Suspension or Expulsion, 91 A.L.R. 6th 365, II § 4 (2014). 
279. See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219 (“[S]chools may punish expressive conduct that occurs 
outside of school, as if it occurred inside the ‘schoolhouse gate,’ under certain very limited 
circumstances, none of which are present here.”); Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3433 (“Further 
undergirding several opinions is the notion of intentionality . . . [as] for other potential factors, their 
role in the analysis is less than clear.”). 
280. See, e.g., Snyder, 650 F.3d at 940 (“Regardless of its place of origin, speech intentionally 
directed towards a school is properly considered on-campus speech.”). See also Roy Allen Weeks, 
The First Amendment, Public School Student, and the Need for Clear Limits on School Officials’ 
Authority Over Off-Campus Student Speech, 46 GA. L. REV. 1157, 1182 (2012) (discussing that 
off-campus speech can be subject to discipline “based on its target audience, whether the audience 
receives it, and what the recipients do upon receiving it”). 
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the school, and clear evidence to the contrary could be difficult to 
establish.281 Therefore, school administrators might have a difficult time 
punishing speech without express evidence of an intention to disrupt.282 
This express evidence standard results in greater protection of student 
speech compared to other approaches.283 For example, the speech in 
Wilson, which was unprotected in the Second Circuit, would be protected 
under this test due to the precautions taken to make the website private.284 
The Third Circuit’s context requirement bolsters students’ rights in the 
digital age.285 The intent precursor to the reasonable foreseeability 
threshold allows students to speak on social media platforms about 
controversial topics without fear of being punished, so long as the speaker 
does not intend for the speech to cause a substantial disruption in 
school.286 Moreover, if a student intends to cause a substantial disruption 
in school based on posts on social media, disciplinary action probably 
would be warranted.287 The intent requirement, while broad, creates a 
protective layer for students’ online speech.288 If the North Carolina 
statute at issue in Packingham would have been written to include 
specific language pertaining to a sex offender’s intent to correspond with 
 
281. See, e.g. T.J. Berndt, Transitions in Friendship and Friends’ Influence, in TRANSITIONS 
THROUGH ADOLESCENCE: INTERPERSONAL DOMAINS AND CONTEXT 57-84 (J.A. Graber et al., 
eds., 1996) (discussing how school-aged children are significantly influenced by their friends and 
social surroundings in making decisions); Valerie Ulene, A Teen’s Friends are a Powerful 
Influence, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/11/health/la-he-the-
md-teens-friends-20110411 (discussing how children’s bad behavior is often to impress friends). 
282. In contrast, schools will have an easier time if there is evidence of an actual substantial 
disruption. See infra, Part IV (proposing a heightened substantial disruption standard). 
283. This standard is more speech protective due to the extra requirement for sustaining 
discipline, as opposed to a mere foreseeability approach used by the Second Circuit. Compare 
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(vacating a student’s suspension due to lack of intent), with Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 
(2d. Cir. 2008) (upholding a student’s suspension based on foreseeability). 
284. In Wilson, the court used a reasonably foreseeable precursor to Tinker to hold a student’s 
online speech was impermissible, even though the student undertook privacy precautions to prevent 
peers, parents, and administrators from finding the website. 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012). Thus, 
under the “intent” approach, the Third Circuit would likely find the students’ conduct permissible.  
285. See infra Part IV (proposing that school policies should include a provision that requires a 
student to intend for their speech to cause a disruption in the school in order to be subject to 
disciplinary action). 
286. See, e.g., Layshock, 650 F.3d at 214 (holding because the student did not intend for his 
profile, ridiculing the school’s principal, to cause a disruption, it was protected speech); J.S. ex rel. 
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding the same). 
287. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919) (stating “[t]he most stringent 
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a 
panic”). 
288. See supra note 283 and accompanying text (arguing this threshold is more speech 
protective than others); infra Part III.A.4 (discussing how the Ninth Circuit’s approach is arguably 
the most speech protective). 
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minors, the Court might have ruled it constitutional.289 
4.  Faced by an Identifiable Threat of School Violence Test 
The Ninth Circuit’s threshold test applies a Tinker analysis to off-
campus speech only when the speech gives rise to an identifiable threat 
of school violence.290 Similar to the Third Circuit approach, this test 
affords more protection for student speech.291 This premise is 
demonstrated in Wynar v. Douglas County School District.292 In Wynar, 
the court upheld a student’s suspension stemming from instant messages 
to classmates that threatened a school shooting.293 The court applied 
Tinker’s material and substantial disruption standard after determining 
that these messages constituted a threat of school violence, placing 
special emphasis on the school’s interest in safety.294 Based on this 
reasoning, it is likely that the speech in Doninger, Kowalski, Wilson, and 
Snyder would be permissible under the First Amendment.295 
While this test advocates for the free expression of students and limits 
the authority of administrators, the test as articulated in Wynar does not 
encompass speech that schools are entitled to suppress.296 The court fails 
to define what constitutes “violence,” whether it be physical violence 
toward the school as a whole or emotional violence against a classmate 
 
289. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (holding the North 
Carolina statute is unconstitutional because it is too broad with no mens rea requirement). 
290. See Wynar v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2013). See also 
Fowler, supra note 260, at 730 (noting the Ninth Circuit approach is “highly protective of student 
speech, and can thus be deemed the most protective of any of those tests developed by other 
circuits”). 
291. See supra notes 283, 288 and accompanying text (describing the Third Circuit’s “intent” 
threshold as speech protective). 
292. Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1062. 
293. Id. at 1065. 
294. Given the knowledge the shootings at Columbine, Thurston and Santee high schools, 
among others, have imparted about the potential for school violence . . . we must take care 
when evaluating a student’s First Amendment right of free expression against school 
officials’ need to provide a safe school environment not to overreact in favor of either. 
Id. at 1069–70. See also KERN ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF SCHOOLS, STUDENTS AND TEACHERS 
IN A NUTSHELL 163 (West Academic ed., 5th ed. 2015) (discussing how in Wynar, the court held 
“school officials do not have to wait for a substantial disruption to occur before taking action”). 
295. The speech at issue in these cases would be permissible under the First Amendment 
because in each instance there was not an identifiable threat of violence, just offensive speech. See 
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 653 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011) (the speech was hateful toward 
a peer); S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District 696 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 
2011) (the blog post was sexually explicit); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School Dist., 650 
F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (the speech ridiculed the school’s principal); Doninger v. 
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d. Cir. 2008) (the speech ridiculed the school’s principal). 
296. Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1068 (holding Tinker may only apply when the speech involves 
violence, but not identifying what test would apply if the speech was not violent). 
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through cyberbullying.297 In this case, it seems that the test only 
encompasses physical harm, forgetting the substantial and detrimental 
effects that cyberbullying has on students and the school environment.298 
Still, by declining to extend Tinker to off-campus speech involving 
anything except threats of school violence, the Ninth Circuit’s test better 
protects students’ First Amendment rights than other circuits’ tests, and 
is more in line with the reasoning in Packingham and Reno.299 Because 
this a content-based restriction on speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny.300 
In disciplining a student for speech on social media that the school thinks 
is an identifiable threat of school violence, the school would have to prove 
that this discipline is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
interest.301 Certainly, protecting students from violence would be a 
compelling interest.302 However, because “violence” is not defined in the 
test, it would likely not be narrowly tailored to further that interest.303 If 
the Ninth Circuit defined what encompasses an identifiable threat of 
school violence, this test would be consistent with strict scrutiny, the 
 
297. Id.; Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3432 (arguing that “if the Wynar test is intended to 
encompass only threats of serious bodily harm, it is uncertain why the line should arbitrarily be 
drawn there”). 
298. Not only does bullying affect students during adolescence, but studies show the effects of 
bullying last long into adulthood. Alice G. Walton, The Psychological Effects of Bullying Last Well 
Into Adulthood, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2013, 12:17 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alicegwalton/2013/02/21/the-psychological-effects-of-bullying-last-
well-into-adulthood-study-finds/#4aee11f91592. See Nicholas Bakalar, Being Bullied Is Bad for 
Your Health, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2014, 3:08 PM), 
https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/12/being-bullied-is-bad-for-your-health/ (analyzing 
studies about the effects of bullying and calling for a legislative response). 
299. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1998). See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069 (holding Tinker does not apply 
absent a threat of violence). 
300. Montroll, supra note 173, at 500 (discussing content-based restrictions, and noting that 
while strict scrutiny always mandates the same test, courts often come to different conclusions 
based on similar facts). See Reno, 521 U.S. at 858 (holding a content-based statute 
unconstitutional). 
301. See Blum, supra note 174 (discussing strict scrutiny as applied to content-based 
restrictions). See also infra Part IV (proposing a model school policy that will pass strict scrutiny, 
although it is typically looked upon with disfavor). 
302. For a look at the compelling interests schools have after the April 20, 1999, shooting at 
Columbine High School, see William C. Nevin, Neither Tinker, Nor Hazelwood, Nor Fraser, Nor 
Morse: Why Violent Student Assignments Represent a Unique First Amendment Challenge?, 23 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 785 (2015). 
303. In Reno, the Supreme Court held that the content-based restriction was not narrowly 
tailored because the words “lewd” and “obscene” were not defined in the statute. 521 U.S. 844, 870 
(1997). Specifically, the Court wrote, “indecency has not been defined to exclude works of serious 
literary, artistic, political or scientific value.” Id. at 863 (emphasis in original). This reasoning can 
be instructive for the Ninth Circuit critique. Because “violence” is not defined, it cannot serve to 
exclude acts that should be impermissible, but are not per the statute. 
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reasoning in Reno, and the holding in Packingham.304 
5.  The Fifth Circuit’s Case-by-Case Approach 
In Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, the Fifth Circuit specifically 
declined to adopt a test to apply to future cases, but ruled on the matter 
based on the individual facts of the case.305 The majority’s reasoning 
allows Tinker to apply to off-campus speech when: “(a) a student 
intentionally directs speech at the school community, and (b) when the 
speech is reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, harass, 
and intimidate a teacher.”306 This test is flawed because it limits 
disciplinary action to speech directed at teachers and does not provide a 
rule for deciding future cases.307 
The first prong of the test—that the student intentionally directs speech 
at the school—is similar to the Third Circuit’s intent precursor, and is 
thus subject to the same praise and criticism.308 As to the second prong 
of the test, Judge Dennis in a dissenting opinion criticized this as a 
content-based restriction, and argued that permissibility hinges on the 
listener’s idiosyncratic interpretation of the speech.309 This vague 
standard will result in inconsistent First Amendment protections.310 This 
 
304. For a commentary regarding the importance of defining terms in a statute or policy, see 
Jeanne Price, Wagging, Not Barking, (Univ. of Nevada, Las Vegas Sch. of Law Scholarly Works 
Grp., Paper No. 764), 
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1786&context=facpub. 
305. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 410 (5th Cir. 2015) (Dennis, J., 
dissenting) (“[a]s an initial matter, I am compelled to point out that the majority opinion’s test 
unabashedly adopts almost the precise wording of the Itawamba County School Board’s 
disciplinary policy”). 
306. Id. at 396. The majority opinion argues this test is consistent with the Fifth Circuit 
precedent in Shanley, Sullivan, and Porter. See Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 
619 (5th Cir. 2004) (analyzing the speech at issue under Tinker, but noting the circuit split regarding 
off-campus speech); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(applying a traditional Tinker analysis without any threshold); Shanley v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 
Bexar Cty., Tex., 462 F.2d 960, 974–75 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying a traditional Tinker analysis). 
307. Bell, 799 F.3d at 400. See Aleaha Jones, Schools, Speech, and Smartphones: Online Speech 
and the Evolution of the Tinker Standard, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 155, 167–70 (analyzing what 
the outcome of Bell would be under a true threat test and a traditional Tinker analysis, while 
providing a critique of the majority’s test laid out in Bell). 
308. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the intent threshold to Tinker as speech protective: “[t]he 
intent precursor to the reasonable foreseeability threshold allows students to speak on social media 
platforms about controversial topics without the fear of being punished, so long as the speaker does 
not intend for the speech to cause a substantial disruption”); see also supra notes 283–289 and 
accompanying text. 
309. Bell, 799 F.3d at 410 (Dennis, J., dissenting); see Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 
U.S. 844, 870 (1998) (stating content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny); Blum, supra 
note 174 (discussing content-based restrictions on speech and the analysis resulting therefrom). 
310. Bell, 799 F.3d at 391 (explaining that student speech issues should be decided with a 
bright-line rule, stating “student-speech claims are evaluated ‘in light of the special characteristics 
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content-based restriction likely would not withstand strict scrutiny under 
Reno because while protection of teachers might be a compelling 
government interest, the means are certainly not narrowly tailored to 
achieve this purpose.311 The court additionally failed to define what 
speech is intended to be subject to punishment; thus, the test is too 
broad.312 
However, the most problematic part of this test is that it only pertains 
to speech directed at teachers, leaving out entirely offensive speech made 
toward peers.313 While a blog post harassing a teacher at a school would 
be subject to discipline, assuming all the other elements of the test are 
satisfied, the same post about a student could be permissible under this 
test.314 In this regard, the Fifth Circuit deemphasizes the harmful effects 
of cyberbullying on students.315 
 
of the school environment, beginning by categorizing the student speech at issue’”) (quoting 
Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 375 (5th Cir. 2011)). As one commentator put it, “the Fifth 
Circuit’s Bell . . . decision misapplies Tinker and creates even more ambiguity with its vague 
exception.” Katherine E. Geddes, First Amendment – Student Speech – Why Bell Tolls a Review of 
Tinker’s Application to Off-Campus, Online Speech, 69 SMU L. REV. 275, 281 (2016). 
311. Bell, 799 F.3d at 399. See Leets, supra note 182, at 299 (discussing Reno’s application to 
online hate speech). While the Leets article does not address the facts of Bell, it is instructive in 
evaluating circumstances in which online hate speech would not be protected. 
312. Bell, 799 F.3d at 399. See Price, supra note 304, at 1000 (discussing the importance of 
defining terms in statutes in order to prevent litigation and confusion in executing a statute). For 
another interpretation of the reasoning in Kowalski, see Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3431 
(articulating that the test set forth in Kowalski in practice is the same as the test articulated in 
Doninger and adopted by the Second and Eighth circuits, stating “the standard is susceptible to the 
same criticism that the Doninger test warrants”). 
313. The court in Bell articulated the Tinker test as follows: 
Accordingly, in the light of our court’s precedent, we hold Tinker governs our analysis, 
as in this instance, when a student intentionally directs at the school community speech 
reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a teacher, 
even when such speech originated, and was disseminated, off-campus without the use of 
school resources. 
Bell, 799 F.3d at 396. The test notably neglects to address speech that threatens, harasses, and 
intimidates a student. See Shaver, supra note 15, at 1573 (discussing problems with the test 
articulated by the majority and advocating for the Supreme Court to hear a case to resolve this 
issue). 
314. The court may have ruled in this manner due to the school policy’s language. The court 
states, “the school-district’s policy demonstrates an awareness of Tinker’s substantial-disruption 
standard, and the policy’s violation can be used as evidence” supporting the discipline. Bell, 799 
F.3d at 399. 
315. See supra note 288 and accompanying text (describing the harmful effects of cyberbullying 
carried into adulthood). However, many states have enacted cyberbullying laws to combat the issue 
of violence against students. See Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: 
Keeping the Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 884 
(2010) (focusing on how cyberbullying laws fit within the realm of Supreme Court student speech 
cases, concluding that “[u]ntil the Supreme Court clarifies the authority of schools over online 
speech, legislators and educators must respond to cyberbullying in a way that avoids restricting 
students’ free speech rights”). 
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It is evident that the federal appellate courts need the Supreme Court 
to articulate a uniform test in order to properly address this pressing 
issue.316 In the meantime, school districts should take matters into their 
own hands, borrowing some of the tests the various circuits employed to 
craft their own social media policies.317 In order to do so, it is useful to 
study individual school policies to discover what speech schools find 
inside the scope of discipline, and what speech is afforded protection.318 
B.  Analyzing School Social Media Policies 
Off-campus student speech jurisprudence is in disarray.319 Absent 
guidance from the Supreme Court, the federal appellate courts have 
distorted the framework of Tinker to apply their own, inconsistent 
analyses to fit the facts before them.320 While some appellate courts 
interpret the Court’s holdings in cases involving student speech occurring 
inside the school to apply to speech occurring outside the school, this may 
be looking too liberally at these holdings.321 Some public school 
guidelines, which regulate students’ use of social media outside the 
schoolhouse, are impermissible blanket restrictions on speech masked by 
 
316. This statement has been articulated throughout many scholarly articles discussing the 
issue. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Time for the Supreme Court to Address Off-Campus, Online 
Student Speech, 91 OR. L. REV. 621, 625 (2012) (arguing for the Supreme Court to address the 
issue and analyzing the inconsistent rulings based on the federal appellate court tests); Shaver, 
supra note 15, at 1573 (advocating for the Court to address off-campus online speech and providing 
a model test for the Supreme Court to use when it does so). 
317. See infra Part IV (providing a model threshold for schools to implement while drafting 
policies pertaining to social media). 
318. See infra Part III.B (analyzing the potential constitutional issues by considering each 
school policy with a Packingham and Reno lens, applying the Court’s reasoning). 
319. See supra Part III.A (considering the constitutionality of the many threshold tests to Tinker 
adopted by the federal courts of appeals). For an example of why this jurisprudence is in disarray, 
compare Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d. Cir. 2008) (using the reasonable foreseeability 
threshold and upholding the punishment for an off-campus blog post), with Layshock ex rel. 
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (using the intent 
threshold to vacate the punishment for an off-campus blog post). Based on nearly the same facts, 
the Second Circuit and the Third Circuit had completely different holdings. 
320. Scott Dranoff has noted the inconsistency in holdings as a result of numerous tests: 
These tests include abandonment of the Tinker test in off-campus speech cases, 
application of the Tinker test with additional restrictions, various methods of determining 
the speaker’s intended place of dissemination, and frameworks for determining what 
types of off-campus speech may be regulated under restrictions for on-campus speech. 
Dranoff, supra note 108, at 652. 
321. See Mary Noe, Sticks and Stones Will Break My Bones but Whether Words Harm Will Be 
Decided by a Judge, 88 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 39, 40 (2016) (discussing that judges have frequently  
decided whether punishment for student speech is permissible, a decision that should be left to the 
legislature). But see Watt Lesley Black, Jr., Omnipresent Student Speech and the Schoolhouse 
Gate: Interpreting Tinker in the Digital Age, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 531, 551 (2015) (arguing that 
the reasonably foreseeable test is speech protective and judges do not over-extend their authority). 
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language consistent with Tinker.322 These overbroad policies leave 
students confused and give administrators too much power to decide what 
constitutes permissible expression and what should be subject to 
discipline.323 These social media policies, discussed in this Section, 
would most likely be found impermissible under Reno and Packingham 
because they are not narrow enough to survive the scrutiny the Supreme 
Court applied in those cases.324 
1.  Jordan-Elbridge Central School District 
Jordan-Elbridge Central School District in Jordan, New York, enacted 
a social media policy in 2010 that severely limits students’ right to free 
speech on social media.325 Specifically, the policy requires students to 
“refrain from reporting, speculating, discussing or giving any opinions on 
topics related to the Jordan-Elbridge Central School District or students 
of the district that could be considered sensitive, confidential or 
disparaging.”326 The policy includes fourteen restrictions on students’ 
personal use of social media, and states that failure to abide by these rules 
could result in disciplinary action.327 Because the policy fails to define 
the type of speech subject to discipline, it serves as an impermissible 
content-based and content-neutral restriction on speech.328 
 
322. See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the Pottsville Area School District’s policy, in which the 
language is consistent with the language found in Tinker). For an example of the problems schools 
face when attempting to regulate social media, see Jon Camp, I-Team: School fights fuel debate 
over social media policies, ABC (May 4, 2017), http://abc11.com/news/school-fights-fuel-debate-
over-social-media-policies-/1952960/. 
323. Cathryn Rudolph, Unleashing Law Reviews Onto Social Media: Preventing Mishaps with 
a Social-Media Policy, 30 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 187, 187 (2013) (arguing that “[l]aw reviews can 
successfully implement a social-media plan and avoid mishaps by informing students what is 
expected, what is prohibited, and how they will be held accountable”). Although this statement 
pertains to students in graduate schools, its argument applies to students in secondary school as 
well. Id. 
324. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to a content-neutral policy); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1998) 
(applying strict scrutiny to a content-based policy). 
325. Jordan-Elbridge Central School District is located in upstate New York, in between 
Rochester and Syracuse in Onondaga County. For a statistical look at its test scores and 
comparisons to other public schools in the state of New York, see Evans et al., New York School 
Test Scores, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/new-york-
schools-test-scores/counties/onondaga/districts/jordan-elbridge-central-school-district. 
326. Jordan-Elbridge Social Media Policy, supra note 162 (providing a content-based 
restriction subject to strict scrutiny under Reno). 
327. Id. These fourteen restrictions are limited to conduct on personal social media profiles. 
Although the school “does not routinely monitor personal online accounts,” it reserves the right to 
address issues that violate the policy. Id. 
328. Id. The policy requires students to refrain from posting on social media anything that can 
be considered sensitive, confidential, or disparaging. However, the policy fails to define any of 
these terms. The Court held in Reno that because the statute did not define the words necessary to 
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2.  Pottsville Area School District 
The Pottsville Area School District enacted a particularly restrictive 
social media policy in 2011.329 The detailed policy restricts certain forms 
of social media: blogs, social networking sites, media-sharing sites, and 
virtual worlds.330 Specifically, the policy limits the content on each of 
these platforms when the subject matter is sensitive to students and 
employees, and/or when the content is used for bullying, a defamatory or 
discriminatory purpose, threats, and/or illegal activities.331 The policy 
also borrows the Tinker language and bans students from posting on 
social media any content that disrupts the school or the rights of others.332 
Moreover, the policy cautions students from using exaggeration, humor, 
and characterizations.333 Any student who violates these rules will be 
subject to discipline.334 
This is a content-based restriction, and under the Supreme Court 
holdings regarding the Internet, it is subject to strict scrutiny.335 While 
the interest will probably be considered compelling, the policy may not 
 
hold someone accountable for violating the statute, it did not withstand strict scrutiny. Reno, 521 
U.S. at 860; see also Jacques, supra note 176, at 1982 (stating “[b]y failing to narrowly tailor the 
language of the statute . . . Congress passed an act that was dangerously vague and clearly 
unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis”). 
329. Pottsville Area School District is located in Pottsville, Pennsylvania, outside of Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania. As such, it is within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit. See supra Parts I.D.2, 
III.A.3 (discussing the Third Circuit threshold test as applied to off-campus student speech); see 
also Best High Schools: Pennsylvania: Districts: Pottsville Area High School: Rankings, U.S. 
NEWS 2017, https://www.usnews.com/education/best-high-
schools/pennsylvania/districts/pottsville-area-sd/pottsville-area-high-school-17290 (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2018) (providing information about the district’s rankings, scholarly performance, and 
demographics). 
330. Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162 (listing blogs, microblogs, social networks, 
media sharing, Wikis, virtual worlds, email, and text messaging as encompassed by the term “social 
media”). 
331. Compare Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162, at ¶ 4 (stating that students must 
not promote illegal drugs, activities, or violence), with Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 
(2007) (holding speech that promotes illegal activity does not deserve First Amendment 
protection). 
332. Specifically, the policy states, “[s]tudents may not disrupt the learning atmosphere, 
educational programs, school activities, and the rights of others.” Pottsville Social Media Policy, 
supra note 162, at ¶ 1. In Tinker, the Supreme Court ruled that conduct that “materially involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others” does not deserve First Amendment 
protection. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). Thus, the 
policy mimics the rule set forth in Tinker, but applies it to off-campus speech. 
333. Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162, at ¶ 4 (stating “students should be cautious 
when they use exaggeration, colorful language, guesswork, derogatory remarks, humor, and 
characterizations . . . ”). 
334. Id. 
335. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997). See Montroll, supra note 
173, at 500 (providing a background on content-based restrictions and examples of statutes and 
policies that were upheld under the standard, and those that were struck down). 
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be written narrowly enough to survive heightened scrutiny due to its 
blanket restrictions, similar to Packingham, on student speech.336 
However, because the policy includes definitions and examples of 
content inside the scope of authority, it might meet the narrow tailoring 
requirement.337 But, the school district still must prove that this 
regulation is the least restrictive means to achieve its stated interest.338 
Because this policy restricts nearly all content on social media that could 
cause a disturbance, it encompasses too much speech.339 To withstand 
strict scrutiny and fall in line with Reno and Packingham, this policy 
should be rewritten with less restrictive language.340 
3.  Berkeley County School District 
The Berkeley County School District does not have a specific social 
media policy, but within its student conduct manual is a provision that 
encompasses off-campus student speech.341 The provision states that 
students’ off-campus conduct that is reasonably foreseeable to cause a 
disruption is subject to punishment.342 However, the only example listed 
within the policy that falls under this scope of authority is student social 
media postings for the purpose of inviting others to engage in disruptive 
and hateful conduct toward another student.343 By only listing one 
 
336. Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162. In addressing content-based and content-
neutral regulations, the Court has typically upheld the government’s interest as compelling or 
important. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (finding the 
government’s interest in protecting minor children important). 
337. Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162. It is specific in that it defines the types of 
social media covered by the policy, and if it was considered a content-neutral regulation on speech, 
it might meet the requirements for intermediate scrutiny. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738. 
However, because it is a content-based restriction, the definitions should cover not only the fora 
that are subject to restriction, but the subject matters as well. 
338. For a look at what it takes for a regulation or policy to pass the “least restrictive means” 
test, see Alan O. Sykes, The Least Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 403 (2003). 
339. Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162. 
340. See, e.g., Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (holding a statute unconstitutional because it 
restricts lawful speech as a means to prevent unlawful speech); Reno, 521 U.S. at 868 (holding a 
restriction on speech must not suppress too much speech). 
341. Berkeley Policy, supra note 163. Berkeley County School District is located in South 
Carolina and was the defendant in Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
See supra Part I.D.3 (discussing the Kowalski decision). 
342. Berkeley Policy, supra note 163, at 27. See supra Part III.A.1 (analyzing the 
constitutionality of the reasonably foreseeable threshold to Tinker). 
343. Berkeley’s Student Handbook states: 
Students’ off-campus conduct that might reasonably be expected to cause disruption in 
the school is prohibited and may result in disciplinary action. This includes, but is not 
limited to, blogs and social media postings created for the purpose of inviting others to 
indulge in disruptive and hateful conduct toward a student or staff member. 
Berkeley Policy, supra note 163, at 27. For further discussion regarding a student’s intent to cause 
a disruption, see supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the Third Circuit’s intent threshold to Tinker, 
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example of speech within the scope of discipline, this policy is too broad, 
and leaves out examples of speech that the school is entitled to curtail, 
such as threats of physical violence.344 Furthermore, because any online 
speech is reasonably foreseeable to make its way to school grounds, 
punishment of protected political speech that causes a disruption could 
curtail students’ First Amendment rights.345 
Although this policy is on the right track toward being specific enough 
to achieve the school’s interest, in order to meet the threshold and fit 
within the holding in Packingham, the policy must be more narrow to 
encompass the types of speech that the school has authority to 
discipline.346 This school policy potentially limits more speech than 
necessary and, as such, the policy is under-inclusive and is not narrowly 
tailored to achieve an important interest.347 
C.  The “Chilling Effect” Stemming from Restrictive Threshold Tests 
and Limiting School Policies 
The circuit split regarding whether Tinker can apply to off-campus 
speech, and to what end it does apply, has led to confusion in the 
courtroom.348 But, how has it affected students outside the classroom?349 
The conduct of the students in Kowalski and Layshock is very similar, but 
 
considering its positives and negatives). 
344. The Second Circuit in Wisniewski refused to apply a “true threat” approach because 
“school officials have significantly broader authority to sanction student speech than the [true 
threat] standard allows.” Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 
34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007). This type of thinking could encompass the Berkeley County School District 
policy, as the school district has authority to discipline more than what is explicitly listed in the 
policy, such as threats of death or serious bodily harm. 
345. See supra Part III.A.1 (critiquing the “reasonably foreseeable” threshold to the Tinker test 
in greater detail). 
346. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (holding the statute 
unconstitutional and inviting the North Carolina legislature to craft a more narrowly written statute 
to withstand strict scrutiny). 
347. Compare Berkeley Policy, supra note 163, at 27 (limiting off-campus social media speech 
that is reasonably expected to cause a substantial disruption, potentially limiting too much speech), 
with Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (holding that the statute limiting social media was 
unconstitutional because it limited too much speech). 
348. See supra Part I.D (discussing the circuit split and the tests each circuit uses to address off-
campus speech); supra Part III.A (analyzing the different approaches taken by the circuits); see 
also Calve, supra note 82, at 386 (arguing for the need for the Supreme Court to put an end to the 
circuit inconsistency). 
349. When policies regarding social media use are vague, students might refuse to speak their 
mind due to fear of punishment. Justice Kennedy articulated the concept of a chilling effect in 
Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission: “Prolix laws chill speech for the same reason 
that vague laws chill speech: People ‘of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the law’s] 
meaning and differ as to its application.’” 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010) (quoting Connally v. General 
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
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their holdings are contradictory.350 The student in Kowalski created a 
social media profile to post hateful messages about another student and 
the Fourth Circuit upheld the student’s suspension.351 The student in 
Layshock created a social media profile to post hateful messages about 
the school’s principal and the Third Circuit vacated the student’s 
suspension.352 The only difference was the target of the online speech.353 
Unfortunately for some students, the social media policies adopted by 
their school districts are likely to have a chilling effect on off-campus 
expression.354 In a dissenting opinion in Bell v. Itawamba County School 
Board, Judge Harris wrote: “for students whose performance at school 
largely determines their fate in the future, even the specter of punishment 
will likely deter them from engaging in off-campus expression that could 
be deemed controversial or hurtful to school officials.”355 How can a 
student know that what he or she writes on a personal account is 
something that a school administrator might find to be a substantial 
disruption to the school environment?356 While it is important to ensure 
the school environment is safe, it cannot be at the cost of students’ First 
Amendment rights.357 
The tests employed by each circuit are subjective, given the fact-
specific nature of Tinker.358 Because the determination of the substantial 
 
350. Compare Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 653 F.3d 565, 577 (4th Cir. 2011) (using the 
“sufficient nexus” precursor to Tinker), with Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 
650 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (using the intent precursor to Tinker). 
351. Kowalski, 653 F.3d at 567; see supra note 116 and accompanying text (explaining the 
students’ speech). 
352. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 210; see supra note 112 and accompanying text (explaining the 
students’ speech). 
353. See supra Parts I.D.2, I.D.3 (discussing the court’s reasoning in Layshock and Kowalski, 
respectively). 
354. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (stating that these standards imposed by the courts “would risk ensnaring any off-campus 
expression that happened to discuss school related matters”); Kinsley, supra note 178, at 258 
(discussing the “chilling effect” and tracing its background). 
355. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 421 (5th Cir. 2015) (“What will be the direct 
consequence of these various layers of vagueness upon students’ First Amendment freedoms? ‘[I]t 
will operate to chill or suppress the exercise of those freedoms by reason of vague terms or 
overbroad coverage.’”) (quoting Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 131 (2011)). 
356. See Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162, at ¶ 5 (restricting social media speech 
that could foreseeably cause a disruption in the school); supra note 337 and accompanying text 
(describing how students will refrain from speaking if policies are not explicit). 
357. Hughes, supra note 143, at 220 (advocating for a balance between students’ rights and 
schools’ authority). 
358. Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3399: 
Specifically, the Supreme Court has granted public school officials considerable 
authority to regulate student expression within the school community. . . . School 
authority to regulate student speech is typically justified based on the “special 
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disruption, foreseeability, or potential violence tests depends almost 
entirely on the facts in the specific cases, students are left in the dark as 
to the limits within which they can express themselves.359 Due to the risk 
of chilled speech, schools need to respond by creating policies that take 
not only the circumstances behind certain speech into account, but also 
the intent of the speaker and the content of the speech. Such an approach 
will maintain fairness and encourage free expression, especially during 
the cyber era.360 
IV.  PROPOSAL 
Public schools have an interest in promoting safety, order, and the 
well-being of students, while students have an interest in protecting their 
First Amendment rights.361 When these two interests conflict, there needs 
to be a clearly articulated standard that balances both.362 Student speech 
that occurs inside the school should be analyzed with the Tinker 
standard,363 but students’ online speech occurring off-campus cannot be 
subject to the same limitations.364 Packingham held that social media is 
 
characteristics” of the school environment and the unique role of public schools in 
developing the nation’s youth. 
See Barry P. McDonald, Regulating Student Cyberspeech, 77 MO. L. REV. 727, 752 (2012) (noting 
the circuit split “created a situation where courts seem to be permitting or disallowing cyberspeech 
according to their subjective views of whether students should be allowed to engage in it or not”) 
(emphasis added). 
359. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the foreseeability and potential violence approaches); 
supra note 356 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion plaguing students when they do 
not know what type of speech is subject to restrictions). 
360. See infra Part IV (proposing a standard that schools should follow when implementing 
social media policies). See also School District Affirms Student Speech Rights After Tenth Grader 
Punished for ‘Gay? Fine By Me’ T-Shirt, NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 6, 2007), 
https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/school-district-affirms-student-speech-rights-after-10th-
grader-punished-gay-fine-me (quoting a student on censorship issues: “you cannot cure this chill”). 
361. See Calvert, supra note 254, at 251 (noting the need for a clear test to “strike[] a proper 
balance between the First Amendment speech rights of off-campus minors and the need of schools 
to function smoothly and effectively as educational institutions will be a prodigious and staggering 
task”); supra note 261 and accompanying text (comparing the interests of schools in cases before 
the courts). 
362. Landfried, supra note 131, at 200 (discussing the need for a balance between authority and 
students’ freedoms). See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 389–90 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(noting the necessity of balancing the constitutional rights of students with the need to protect 
teachers and principals). 
363. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (defining the 
substantial and material disruption requirement in deciding students’ free speech rights on school 
grounds). See Ceglia, supra note 24, at 950 (noting the Supreme Court has not declared that Tinker 
applies to off-campus speech). 
364. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (Smith, C.J., concurring) (arguing Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech and that “the 
First Amendment protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it protects 
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protected speech, but government—in this case, a school district—may 
pass policies to limit usage so long as the means are substantially related 
to the school’s important interest.365 Similarly, Reno illustrated that 
content-based restrictions on Internet speech must be analyzed under the 
strict scrutiny test.366 The holdings in Reno and Packingham can be used 
to guide school districts enacting policies governing social media use 
occurring outside school grounds.367 
Because every school district has different needs and interests, this 
Comment explores a standard for schools to keep in mind while crafting 
policies that fit the needs of the school, rather than suggesting every 
school district should use one specific policy. This proposed standard will 
first consider whether the speech occurred on- or off-campus.368 If the 
speech occurred off-campus, the speech must have actually caused a 
material and substantial disruption, unless a ‘true threat’ can be proven, 
in which case the school will have the authority to punish the speech 
without proof of a disruption.369 If the speech did cause a material and 
substantial disruption, the school must then determine the speaker’s 
intent—specifically, whether he or she purposely caused the disruption 
in school—which can be achieved by looking at the content and form of 
the speech.370 
A.  Defining the Geographical Limits for Speech: On- or Off-Campus? 
The first question to address to determine whether the speech can be 
subject to discipline is where the speech occurred.371 As articulated in 
Tinker, the authority to discipline speech is limited to on-campus speech 
or, as Morse held, school-sponsored events.372 A clear indication of on-
 
speech by citizens in the community at large”). 
365. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (articulating that content-
neutral regulations on speech are subject to intermediate scrutiny). See also Redish, supra note 199, 
at 128 (describing intermediate scrutiny). 
366. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1998). 
367. See supra Part II (discussing the factual background and reasoning in Reno and 
Packingham); see also Klinker, supra note 196 (noting that after Packingham, social media is 
considered protected speech). 
368. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the jurisdictional limits of authority to discipline). 
369. See infra Part IV.B.1 (advocating for a heightened material and substantial disruption 
standard, unless it can be proven that the speech amounts to a “true threat”). 
370. See infra Part IV.C (determining the jurisdictional limits of authority to discipline). 
371. This is important because it determines what test the speech will be subject to: Tinker or 
the proposed standard set forth in this Comment. The Second and Fourth circuits have adopted this 
geographical test. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing the different 
tests applied to on- and off-campus speech); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (holding off-campus speech is subject to greater protection than on-campus speech). 
372. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (holding students 
do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” 
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campus online speech would be if a student uses a school computer on 
school grounds to post a threatening message on his or her Facebook 
profile.373 In contrast, off-campus speech encompasses all speech 
written, spoken, or posted online occurring off-campus, outside school 
hours, and not at any school-sponsored event.374 Consider a hypothetical 
situation in which a student uses her personal cell phone to write a 
Facebook post in the school’s parking lot during a lunch break.375 This 
type of speech would be considered on-campus speech.376 In contrast, a 
post that is made while the same student is walking to school, not yet on 
school property and before school hours begin, would be considered off-
campus speech.377 If schools clearly articulate the difference between off-
campus and on-campus speech, it will be easier for students to know 
when their speech will likely be protected and schools will be able to 
easily determine what analysis to conduct when assessing if the student 
should be punished.378 
B.  Substantial and Material Disruption Plus 
If speech is deemed to be off-campus, the next step is to determine 
 
but limiting its discussion to on-campus speech). 
373. The model policy relating to this on-campus speech could be written as: “On-Campus 
Student Speech: A student may be subject to disciplinary action for any speech verbally spoken, 
written, or posted through the Internet occurring during school hours, on a school computer, or at 
a school-sponsored event when the speech materially and substantially disrupts the school 
environment.” See also Berkeley Policy, supra note 163, at 21–22 (articulating a separate policy 
for acceptable use of school technology and computer systems). 
374. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, alluded to 
the premise that off-campus speech is subject to different limitations, noting: “If respondent had 
given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply 
because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate.” 478 U.S. 675, 688 
(1986) (Brennan, J., concurring); but see Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 419 (2007) (extending 
the jurisdiction of school authorities to discipline student speech to off-campus, school-sponsored 
events). 
375. This would be considered on-campus speech because it occurred on school property and 
during school hours. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 424 (providing a policy perspective on this limitation: 
“[d]uring school hours . . . parents are not present to provide protection and guidance . . .”); Porter 
v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 2004) (advocating for a clear delineation 
of geographical limits for protected student speech). 
376. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (holding speech that occurred on campus is subject to lower 
protection); supra note 375 and accompanying text (comparing cases with geographical standards). 
377. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (noting the differences in protection speech receives when it occurs 
on campus or off campus). See generally Fronk, supra note 227, at 1438 (providing examples of 
off-campus speech). 
378. Rudolph, supra note 323, at 187 (discussing the importance of clear policies so “students 
know what is expected, what is prohibited, and how they will be held accountable”). For an example 
of policies that do not meet this standard, see supra Part III.B (analyzing the broad policies that 
leave students confused and chill student speech). 
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whether it actually caused a substantial and material disruption.379 Unless 
there is an actual disruption to the school environment, there is not a 
strong enough nexus to give administrators the authority to justify 
reaching outside the schoolhouse gate and into the free speech rights of 
these students.380 Courts have struggled to define what speech rises to the 
level of a material and substantial disruption, which has led to a skewed 
delineation between what constitutes a substantial and material disruption 
and what constitutes an insignificant one.381 Therefore, defining these 
terms is critical if these proposed standards are to withstand any level of 
scrutiny.382 
Substantial is defined as having “considerable importance, size, or 
worth and not imaginary or illusory.”383 Material is “having real 
importance or great consequences.”384 Many courts have relied on a 
student’s or a teacher’s negative feelings or mere school gossip to justify 
their determination that the speech was a material and substantial 
disruption.385 By including the definitions of material and substantial in 
school policies, schools are given clear guidelines for making disciplinary 
decisions without having to base them on the subjective feelings of the 
target of the speech.386 Further, defining what constitutes a material and 
substantial disruption precludes discipline for any trivial or offensive 
conduct that did not cause any harm to the school environment.387 For 
 
379. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (originating the 
“substantial and material” disruption test); but see supra Part III.A (critiquing the additional 
threshold tests applied to Tinker by the federal courts that dilute Tinker’s framework). 
380. Willard, supra note 214, at 312 (“[a] complication of the boundless nature of the internet 
emerges when a student is disciplined before the speech has the opportunity to affect the school”). 
381. Levin, supra note 25, at 889 (“[t]he current ad hoc approach to determining whether a 
school district can reasonably forecast substantial disruption to the school environment has resulted 
in unpredictable, and therefore unfair, decisions”); see also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (providing that “[t]hose officials involved in 
the educational process perform important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions . . . the 
authority of public school officials is not boundless, however”) (emphasis added). 
382. Price, supra note 304 (discussing the importance of defining terms and providing clear 
guidelines in order to protect the statute’s true intent). See Rudolph, supra note 323, at 199 (arguing 
that defining terms in social media policies is critical to ensure students have knowledge of what is 
and is not tolerated). 
383. Substantial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, (11th ed. 2017). 
384. Material, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, (11th ed. 2017). 
385. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008) (placing special emphasis on the 
principal’s feelings and opinion alone to uphold the student’s discipline); but see J.S. ex rel. H.S. 
v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 863–64 (Pa. 2002) (noting that the teacher’s feelings 
were important, but it was because the offended feelings contributed to a leave of absence that the 
speech created a material and substantial disruption). 
386. See supra notes 381–382 and accompanying text (explaining the inconsistent results due 
to undefined tests). 
387. Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3434 (arguing “to be sufficient to justify school discipline 
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example, a student’s blog post about how much he despised a teacher that 
caused mere chatter in the school and emotional distress to the teacher, 
but did not cause a greater negative effect on the school environment, 
would garner First Amendment protection.388 In contrast, the derogatory 
comments about a teacher in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School 
District left her unable to complete the school year due to severe stress 
stemming from the specific post.389 This affected students due to the loss 
of a cohesive curriculum plan because of the influx of different substitute 
teachers.390 This is an example of speech that actually caused a material 
and substantial disruption, while the same speech that did not have this 
effect probably would not, and thus would be subject to First Amendment 
protection.391 
Therefore, the reactions and offended feelings of a student or teacher 
will not constitute a material and substantial disruption unless it can be 
shown that there is severe physical or emotional harm endured that also 
affected the school environment.392 The school administrators, or an 
objective third party to the speech, will determine if the speech caused a 
material and substantial disruption based on the facts and circumstances 
of the situation.393 Trivial disruptions will not be within the realm of 
authority to punish because there must be more than some mild 
distraction or curiosity created by the speech to justify the school 
abridging students’ First Amendment rights.394 While it is important for 
 
under Tinker, a student’s off-campus speech must be sufficiently severe . . .”); see also supra Part 
III.A (critiquing methods employed by courts that do not rely on the actual outcome of the speech, 
but only the potential for a substantial disruption to occur). 
388. See Willard, supra note 214, at 313 (providing examples of situations in which speech 
would garner protection). 
389. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 852. 
390. Id. (“As a result of Mrs. Fulmer’s inability to return to work, three substitute teachers were 
required to be utilized which disrupted the educational process of the students . . .”). For an analysis 
of how students are affected by teachers’ absences, see Raegen T. Miller, Richard J. Murnane, & 
John B. Willett, Do Teacher Absences Impact Student Achievement? Longitudinal Evidence from 
One Urban School District 4–25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13356, 
2007). 
391. This example could be listed in the schools’ policy to further clarify what is within the 
scope of authority and what is not. See Willard, supra note 12, at 625 (listing examples of other 
instances that would cause a substantial and material disruption in a school). 
392. This proposed approach is similar to the Ninth Circuit’s “faced with an identifiable threat 
of school violence” approach. See supra Part III.A.4 (describing the approach taken by the Ninth 
Circuit). See, e.g., Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that Tinker only applies when there is a threat of school violence). 
393. It is important to note that school administrators may be the target of the speech, and as 
such, disciplinary action may be made based on the subjective feelings of the administrator. If this 
is the case, an objective third party must be brought in to determine whether the speech actually 
caused a material and substantial disruption. 
394. Under this approach, the social media posting in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board 
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schools to provide examples of speech that are within their authority to 
discipline, it is imperative to include in the policy the caveat that these 
lists can never be exhaustive due to a constantly changing world.395 
Schools must retain authority to react efficiently and maintain order in 
the school environment when responding to a substantial and material 
disruption stemming from social media conduct, and this language would 
provide that authority.396 
1.  True Threat Exception 
To protect the safety of the students and teachers and the general 
welfare of the school, there must be an exception to the enhanced 
substantial and material standard when the speech poses a threat of death 
or serious bodily harm to a member of the school community.397 Instead 
of waiting for the speech to cause an effect of significant magnitude, 
administrators must be given the discretion to curtail and punish speech 
that will potentially have serious consequences.398 Thus, threats made 
toward a student or teacher will not be permitted under the proposed 
school policy.399 Borrowing Justice O’Connor’s definition, a “true 
threat” should be defined in school policies as statements “where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of intent to commit 
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or a group of 
 
would be outside the school’s authority to punish. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 
379, 383 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding a student’s punishment despite a lack of evidence of a 
substantial and material disruption); see also supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing 
the speech at issue in Bell). 
395. See Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162 (denoting seven instances in which 
“including, but not limited to” is written to expand the authority to punish speech that is not 
included in these limited examples). 
396. Calvert, supra note 254, at 251 (noting the need to balance schools’ interests and students’ 
rights). See also supra note 261 and accompanying text (comparing the interests of schools in cases 
before the courts). 
397. Hughes, supra note 143, at 229 (noting when speech contains a threat “then the student’s 
First Amendment right to free speech does not come into play and schools can act quickly and 
decisively to prevent any danger at school”). See generally supra Part I.C (discussing the “true 
threat” test articulated by the Supreme Court). 
398. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
administrators may curtail speech when it is likely to cause violence in the school). This exception 
to the proposed standard allows administrators to react to a true threat when it is “reasonably 
foreseeable” to cause a substantial disruption, borrowing the reasoning from the “reasonably 
foreseeable” test and the “faced with an identifiable threat of violence” test. See supra Part III.A.1, 
III.A.4 (discussing the approaches taken by the circuit courts from which this proposal borrows). 
399. See Calvert, supra note 149, at 767 (discussing the interests a school has in protecting 
students and teachers, noting “[s]chool administrators rightfully are concerned about stopping 
violence on their campuses . . .”). 
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individuals.”400 The intent prong of this definition is important.401 This 
incorporates a portion of the test the Third Circuit uses to analyze off-
campus speech, but tweaks it to focus on the intent to inflict harm, rather 
than the intent to cause a disruption.402 
To prove intent, school officials should have the authority to consider 
the circumstances behind the speech, but place the safety and well-being 
of the school community above the speech rights of the student.403 Thus, 
when speech amounts to a true threat, school administrators will have the 
authority to censor and punish this speech before it causes a material and 
substantial disruption, regardless of whether such a disruption actually 
occurs.404 If these elements are met, the school’s analysis is complete and 
appropriate discipline may be imposed.405 
This heightened substantial and material disruption standard 
incorporates ideas that the federal appellate courts found important, but 
does not reflect some of the threshold tests that serve to restrict students’ 
free speech rights.406 Moreover, it allows for use of the true threat 
exception in order to prevent violence and maintain order in the schools, 
while staying inside the realm of Packingham.407 Once a school finds that 
 
400. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
401. Stanner, supra note 72, at 409–12 (arguing that in the justice system “intent” is necessary 
to punish a student in a post-Columbine world, as it is often difficult to distinguish between jokes 
and real threats). 
402. See supra Part III.A.3 (analyzing the Third Circuit’s intent threshold to Tinker); see also 
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(placing special emphasis on the student’s intent in order to vacate his suspension). 
403. The Supreme Court alluded to this premise in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, articulating 
that state interests in morality and order outweigh the slight social value inherent in such violent 
speech. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). But see Christi Cassel, Keep Out of MySpace!: Protecting 
Students from Unconstitutional Suspensions and Expulsions, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 650 
(2007) (noting that while schools should be concerned with safety, schools lack sufficient 
guidelines regarding the appropriateness of discipline they impose relating to online speech, 
resulting in decisions that may violate students’ First Amendment rights).  
404. See supra note 398 and accompanying text (discussing that it must be reasonably 
foreseeable that the threat will cause harm). 
405. This Comment proposes a three-part test, but if the speech amounts to a true threat, the 
third part does not have to be analyzed. See infra Part IV.C (discussing analysis of the intent of the 
speaker through content and form to determine if the speech will be protected). 
406. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the threshold tests incorporated in the proposal); supra Part 
III.A.3 (discussing the “intent” approach taken by the Third Circuit, which is incorporated as an 
element of this proposal); see also supra Part III.A.4 (analyzing the “faced with an identifiable 
threat of violence” approach taken by the Ninth Circuit, which is also incorporated into this 
proposal as an exception to the heightened material and substantial disruption test). 
407. See supra Part IV.B.1 (proposing the “true threat” exception to the heightened material 
and substantial disruption test). This proposal stays within the confines of Packingham because it 
is not a blanket restriction on social media. Moreover, Packingham afforded the government the 
authority to regulate online speech, so long as it survives intermediate scrutiny. Packingham v. 
North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017). 
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the social media speech caused a material and substantial disruption 
within the scope of the proposed policy, the intent of the speaker must be 
analyzed before disciplinary action is warranted.408 
C.  Determining the Intent of the Speaker Through Content and Form 
The next part of the framework for determining whether off-campus 
speech deserves First Amendment protection is to look at the intent of the 
speaker.409 It is important to note that this intent analysis is different than 
the intent threshold the Third Circuit uses because intent should be looked 
at as intent to materially and substantially cause a disruption, not as intent 
to reach the schoolhouse gate.410 Though difficult, determining a 
speaker’s subjective intent is important, and there are factors to assist 
administrators in determining the true intent behind the speech: content 
and form.411 
1.  Content 
Content-based restrictions have been looked upon with disfavor by the 
Supreme Court and frequently fail to withstand strict scrutiny.412 On the 
other hand, content-neutral restrictions are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny and are more likely to survive judicial review.413 This proposal 
recommends that school districts enact a content-based policy, but rather 
than restrict specific content, allow it.414 Online speech created for the 
 
408. See infra Part IV.C (proposing an additional layer to the student speech analysis). 
409. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the Third Circuit approach, which serves as inspiration 
for this prong of the proposal). “Intent” of the speaker is analyzed differently than the true threat 
exception. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
410. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (holding that because the student did not intend for his speech to reach the school, it is not 
foreseeable that it would cause a substantial disruption). See generally Beatus, supra note 111 
(discussing the approach taken by the Third Circuit). 
411. In Texas v. Johnson, Justice Brennan discussed the importance of “intent” in First 
Amendment analysis: “In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative 
elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether an intent to convey a 
particularized message was present and whether the likelihood was great that the message would 
be understood by those who viewed it.” 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
412. See generally Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and 
Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595 (2003) (providing a background 
of content-neutral and content-based regulations and the implications resulting from these 
restrictions). But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (noting “[c]ontent-based 
regulations are presumptively invalid”). 
413. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (stating “[R]egulations that are 
unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny”) (citation 
omitted). See also Jacobs, supra note 412, at 623, 626 (discussing intermediate scrutiny as a lower 
threshold to analyze speech regulations). 
414. Joseph Mead, The First Amendment Protection of Charitable Speech, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 
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purpose of advancing a political opinion, religious affiliation, social 
ideology, or matter of public concern is consistently afforded First 
Amendment protection.415 The Supreme Court held in Texas v. Johnson 
that burning the American flag fits within First Amendment protection 
because of the importance of free political expression, although the act is 
offensive to many.416 Thus, no matter how offensive or what kind of 
disruption the speech causes in the school, if it does not encompass a true 
threat, then political, religious, or social speech may be afforded 
protection.417 For example, a student’s post on her Facebook page stating 
that the LGBTQ community should not be afforded special protection 
would be protected speech, as it expresses a political ideology.418 This 
inverted content-based policy, allowing protections for historically 
protected subject matter, is in accordance with Reno and Packingham.419 
If the speech does not constitute political, religious, or other similarly 
protected speech and it causes a substantial and material disruption, then 
it will be subject to greater scrutiny.420 While there will be no blanket 
restrictions on any type of speech akin to Packingham, speech that might 
otherwise seem protected that causes a material and substantial disruption 
 
FURTHERMORE 57, 61 (2015) (stating “[w]hile a content-based panhandling law will not survive, 
the inverse is not necessarily true”). See also Ashutosh Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation, 
102 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1430 (2016) (arguing for courts to be less hostile to content-based 
regulations, stating “the blanket assumption that all distinctions among categories of protected 
speech are presumptively invalid must be abandoned”). 
415. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (stating 
“private religious speech . . . is fully protected under the Free Speech Clause . . .”); see also 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (holding that the government 
may not restrict political speech). 
416. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (1989) (providing First Amendment protection for political 
speech, regardless of the offensive effect of the speech). See generally C. L. Welborn, Texas v. 
Johnson: The United States Supreme Court Reaffirms the Very Principles of Freedom for which 
the American Flag Stands, 64 TUL. L. REV. 265 (1989) (discussing the reasoning in Texas v. 
Johnson). 
417. In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court addressed whether there is constitutional protection 
for hateful military funeral protesters. 562 U.S. 443 (2011). In an 8-1 decision, Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote the First Amendment protects this speech, however offensive, because “speech is 
powerful” and protection is required of “even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do 
not stifle public debate.” Id. at 460–61. See also Adam Liptak, Justices Rule for Protestors at 
Military Funerals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/us/03scotus.html (discussing the reasoning and impact of 
Snyder v. Phelps). 
418. Phelps, 562 U.S. at 460–61 (stating “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open”) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
419. See Bhagwat, supra note 414, at 1430 (advocating for content-based restrictions to be 
upheld in court); see also Mead, supra note 414, at 58 (arguing for content-based charitable speech 
policies to be permissible). 
420. See supra Part IV.B (proposing an enhanced material and substantial disruption standard). 
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will be prohibited.421 For example, if a student encourages a senior prank 
on his Facebook page, and that specific prank causes a material and 
substantial disruption, the Facebook post will not be protected speech 
even if the content is not illegal, lewd, or offensive.422 But, if the same 
student posts about a religious meeting to be held during lunch, and that 
causes a material and substantial disruption due to offended students and 
teachers, this type of speech would receive constitutional protection.423 
Because the intent of the speaker in the senior prank example was to cause 
a material and substantial disruption in the school, this speech will not be 
protected.424 Conversely, the intent of the student holding the religious 
meeting is to further a religious message rather than to cause harm, so the 
speech will be protected.425 
2.  Form 
The form in which the speech is written may further assist schools in 
determining a student’s intent.426 Often, students use art as a way to 
express themselves.427 Art forms such as songs, literature, poetry, 
 
421. In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that blanket restrictions on 
social media cannot survive intermediate scrutiny nor strict scrutiny. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736–37 
(2017). Because this proposal is not a blanket restriction, as it does not prohibit use of social media 
as a whole, it fits within the realm of protected Internet speech that Packingham intended to protect. 
422. Compare Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding there is 
no First Amendment protection for student speech that is lewd, sexually suggestive, and 
inappropriate), and Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (holding the First Amendment 
does not protect student speech which may reasonably be found to promote drug use or other illegal 
activity), with Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding speech that the 
student intended to cause a substantial disruption is subject to discipline). The type of speech in 
Doninger is akin to the type of speech this example intends to punish. 
423. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (holding political speech is protected 
regardless of the offended feelings it incurs); see also Phelps, 562 U.S. at 460–61 (holding religious 
and social speech is protected to encourage debate). 
424. In order for this speech to be subject to discipline, it still must actually cause a substantial 
and material disruption. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the standard under which a substantial and 
material disruption should be analyzed for non-threatening speech). 
425. William A. Glaser, Worshipping Separation: Worship in Limited Public Forums and the 
Establishment Clause, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1053, 1107 (stating “the Court has indicated that protecting 
religious speech is the core concern of the Free Speech Clause”). As religious speech is consistently 
protected, citizens have very passionate and differing views regarding religious affiliation. For a 
look at the religious divide in the United States, see U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious 
Beliefs and Practices, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 1, 2008), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2008/06/01/u-s-religious-landscape-survey-religious-beliefs-and-
practices/ (providing statistics on the religious preferences of United States citizens). 
426. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 409 (5th Cir. 2015) (Dennis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is axiomatic that music, like other art forms, has historically functioned as a mechanism to raise 
awareness of contemporary social issues.”). See also Landfried, supra note 131, at 216 (arguing for 
a different standard to analyze off-campus student speech in which the court should look at the 
form of the speech in its analysis). 
427. Geri Spieler, Why the Arts Are Still Relevant: Creative Self Expression Matters Even More 
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photographs, and film typically enjoy heightened First Amendment 
protections.428 To ensure that this artistic expression is not curtailed, 
school officials should afford greater leeway to speech that causes a 
substantial and material disruption when it could be considered within 
one of these forms of artistic expression.429 In contrast, a message or 
simple post on social media will not be given the same heightened 
protection as a poem or short film posted on social media.430 Still, the 
school administrators must determine whether the speech is considered a 
true threat and analyze the additional elements of this proposed test before 
concluding the art form is protected.431 This proposal is not implying that 
any speech that constitutes an art form is protected, but rather that greater 
latitude should be given to expressive speech so as to encourage art in the 
digital age.432 
This proposal is a content-based regulation on speech because the 
subject matter is at the heart of the analysis.433 Similar to the Third Circuit 
approach, the intent of the speaker is analyzed through the content and 
form of the speech.434 Unlike the school policies analyzed in Part III, this 
is an inverse content-based regulation, in that it affords heightened 
 
Now, HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2017, 11:38 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/why-
the-arts-are-still-relevant-creative-self-expression_us_597ab0b5e4b06b305561cf6d. See also 
Daniel Mach, The Bold and the Beautiful: Art, Pubic Spaces, and the First Amendment, 72 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 383, 383 (1997) (advocating for First Amendment protection of art “[b]ecause art by its 
very nature stimulates both intellectual and emotional responses, it is uniquely suited to generate 
powerful, often conflicting reactions in both artist and viewer”). 
428. Mach, supra note 427, at 387 (listing art forms that are subject to heightened First 
Amendment protection). 
429. See id. (discussing a variety of art forms that enjoy full First Amendment protection when 
the artistic expression conveys a legitimate message); Landfried, supra note 131, at 214 (“To ensure 
that artistic or therapeutic expression is not being constrained, latitude should be given to speech 
which is in an artistic form.”). 
430. The term “short film” as used here is not intended to encompass all YouTube or other 
videos that are violent or cause a substantial disruption. But see supra notes 20 and 21 for a 
circumstance in which a YouTube “short film” would be subject to heightened First Amendment 
protection under this analysis (providing an example of a situation in which a student posted an 
expressive video on YouTube to raise awareness of the harmful effects of bullying). 
431. See supra Parts IV.A, B (discussing the “other elements” of this proposal necessary in 
order to analyze whether speech should be subject to discipline). 
432. See Landfried, supra note 131, at 214 (stating “[a] student who uses artistic expression as 
a free pass to engage in inappropriate speech should not be afforded that opportunity”). Moreover, 
a painting or a song that is a “true threat” will not be protected. See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of 
the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a drawing depicting 
a teacher being shot is not protected speech). 
433. See generally Jacobs, supra note 412 (providing a background on content-based 
regulations). See supra Part II (discussing the Supreme Court’s take on content-based and content-
neutral regulations). 
434. See supra Part III.A.3 (arguing the Third Circuit’s context requirement serves a positive 
purpose in light of students’ rights in the digital age and borrowing its approach). 
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protection to political or religious speech regardless of the speech’s 
disruption in school.435 These additional protections serve the purpose of 
the First Amendment and combat the “chilling effect” on free speech.436 
Moreover, it allows school officials the authority to discipline students 
for social media postings when the speaker intended to cause a substantial 
and material disruption in the school.437 This proposal successfully 
balances students’ First Amendment rights with the compelling and 
important interest of schools by incorporating elements of the federal 
appellate courts’ approaches while staying within the holdings and 
scrutiny applied in Reno and Packigham.438 
CONCLUSION 
The Internet and social media have become one of the most important, 
if not the most important, places for people to express themselves and 
engage in protected First Amendment activities. As technology continues 
to improve, it will only serve to expand and enhance the ways in which 
people—and especially students—engage and communicate. Because the 
Supreme Court has not provided insight on the issue of off-campus 
student speech, the lower courts are tasked with articulating tests and 
thresholds to determine the limits of schools’ authority to discipline such 
speech. As a result, the federal appellate courts have distorted the 
framework of Tinker and applied their own inconsistent analyses, leading 
to unpredictable First Amendment protection for students. 
Due to the inconsistency between and overbroad tests pronounced by 
the circuit courts, school districts must be the ones to address these issues 
and create social media policies that balance the First Amendment rights 
of students and the need for administrators to maintain authority and 
order in schools. The Supreme Court’s holding in Packingham should 
 
435. Compare Part III.B (analyzing the constitutionality of three schools’ social media policies), 
with Part IV (proposing a standard for schools to follow when crafting social media policies). See 
also Welborn, supra note 416, at 270 (discussing the importance of protecting speech that advances 
a political viewpoint). 
436. Rudolph, supra note 323, at 187–88 (arguing for policies restricting social media to be 
specific so students know when their speech will be protected and when it will not be protected). 
See generally supra Part III.C (discussing the chilling effect on student speech). 
437. Hughes, supra note 143, at 214 (discussing the need for a test to analyze off-campus 
student speech that balances students’ First Amendment rights with administrators’ authority to 
discipline harmful speech); see also Landfried, supra note 131, at 218–19 (arguing “[a] clear 
standard is needed now more than ever, to balance the necessity of keeping schools safe and the 
rights of students to freely express themselves once they exit the schoolhouse gates”). 
438. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to a content-neutral regulation, balancing the government’s interest with sex offenders’ 
right to free speech); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (applying strict 
scrutiny to a content-based restriction, balancing the government’s interest with the right to free 
speech). 
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guide these schools when crafting social media policies, but it will not be 
an easy task. Creating a policy that encompasses all situations and 
provides guidance for every possibility is difficult, but by carefully 
drafting a policy and defining the limitations on speech, schools can 
achieve some much needed clarity while they wait for the Supreme Court 
to address this issue. 
